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A primary function of capital markets is to efficiently allocate capital, which entails the flow of capital to 
investments with the highest returns commensurate with their risk (Tobin, 1984). The market of corporate 
assets fulfills a similar function, where ideally productive assets are transferred to those most equipped 
to manage them (Manne, 1965). A large body of scientific inquiry identifies informational frictions as 
impediments to the efficient functioning of these markets. To mitigate these adverse effects, firms provide 
financial information to parties external to the firm. For the most part, this information is generated by the 
firms’ accounting function and its presentation and disclosure are guided by accounting standards. The 
studies comprising this dissertation empirically investigate several aspects of the role financial accounting 
information plays in asset and capital markets. 
Chapter 2 investigates the voluntary provision of information in the market of corporate assets sales and 
finds evidence which suggests that these disclosures are used to signal the turnaround of poor prior 
performance and financial distress. Chapter 3 investigates the effect of changes in accounting standards 
(i.e., IFRS) on the asymmetric distribution of information amongst capital market participants. The results 
indicate that IFRS adoption in cross-listed firm’s domestic market improves the liquidity of ADRs, in line 
with the reduction of the information disadvantage of investors trading on U.S. exchanges. Finally, chapter 
4 finds that a commitment to providing conservative accounting information disciplines the allocation of 
capital by managers when state legislation increases managerial discretion.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
A primary function of capital markets is to efficiently allocate capital, 
which entails the flow of capital to investments with the highest returns 
commensurate with their risk (Tobin, 1984). The market of corporate assets 
fulfills a similar function, where ideally productive assets are transferred to 
those most equipped to manage them (Manne, 1965). As in other aspects of 
life however, markets seldom lack frictions, preventing the full realization of 
the benefits that could accrue to societies. A large body of scientific inquiry 
identifies and examines these frictions, and finds that the asymmetric 
information endowment of market participants, coupled with differential 
incentives, leads to increased cost of capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or even complete market 
breakdowns (Akerlof, 1970). To mitigate these adverse effects, firms provide 
financial information to parties external to the firm. For the most part, this 
information is generated by the firms’ accounting function and its presentation 
and disclosure are guided by accounting standards. The studies comprising 
this dissertation empirically investigate several aspects of the role financial 
accounting information plays in asset and capital markets.  
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Chapter 21 investigates the provision of information in the market of 
corporate assets. A large proportion of the transfer of corporate assets across 
firms consists of asset sales, where firms divest part of their operations and 
retain others. Prior literature shows that asset sales are used to alter the scope 
of the firm’s activities (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001), where assets are 
reallocated to those who can deploy them more efficiently (Hite et al, 1987). 
Furthermore, asset sales serve as a primary source of financing  (Lang et al, 
1995; Bates, 2005, Arnold et al, 2017), enabling selling firms to focus their 
attention on activities where they can add most value. While the literature 
finds that asset sales are value increasing to both the sellers and buyers (Eckbo 
and Thorburn, 2013), the process of selling assets is currently not well 
understood (Borisova et al, 2013). What is known is that there is a lack of 
sufficient public information regarding the quality of an asset, as reporting 
requirements regarding specific parts of firms are less stringent than those 
required for the firm as a whole and firms may be disinclined to voluntarily 
provide such detailed information given concerns regarding competition 
(Botosan and Stanford, 2005). This implies that potential buyers may need to 
incur high search costs, which in turn leads to less efficient allocation of 
assets. A public announcement that certain assets are available for sale can 
serve to reduce search costs and increase the pool of potential buyers, 
improving the likelihood of a more efficient allocation of assets. 
Our investigation of firms’ supply of information during the process 
of selling assets yields the following. We show that in 42% of completed asset 
sales the selling firm pre-announces its intention to divest, and find that these 
                                                 
1 For this study, the research question and design have been developed by all co-authors 
jointly. Pouyan Ghazizadeh is responsible for the remainder (i.e., data collection, hypothesis 
development, analyses and write-up). 
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announcements elicit economically and statistically significant positive market 
reactions. Our analyses further indicate that pre-announcements are used to 
signal the turnaround of poor prior performance and financial distress. 
Furthermore, our results provide some indications that non-pre-announced 
asset sales involve the sale of assets that are strongly sought after, potentially 
initiated by foreign bidders. These seemingly different incentives for the two 
type of asset sales are also in line with our main finding that markets react 
more positively to pre-announced deals than to non-pre-announced deals. In 
particular, pre-announced deals imply that the future of the remaining 
operations will improve, which constitute the majority of operations of the 
selling firm. The returns to the non-pre-announced deals however seem to 
reflect a premium paid for the sold asset, which generally constitutes a 
minority part of the selling firm. Importantly, our results indicate that markets 
deem pre-announcements credible and that most of the valuation effects of 
the pre-announced asset sales are incorporated into the stock price of the 
selling firm prior to the deal-announcement. This, coupled with our results 
which suggest that the decision to pre-announce is related to the motivation 
for the asset sale, has implications for empirical tests of asset sales. 
Chapter 32 investigates the effect of changes in accounting standards 
on the asymmetric distribution of information amongst capital market 
participants as inferred from changes in trading costs. Facing the prospect of 
trading against parties that are more informed, traders either refrain from 
trading or price-protect themselves, both of which prevent an optimal 
allocation of risk and capital. The concern of being informationally 
                                                 
2 For this study, Pouyan Ghazizadeh has conducted a small part of the data collection, half of 
the empirical analyses and three quarters of the write-up. 
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disadvantaged is particularly pertinent when a firm’s securities trade on more 
than one exchange, with one exchange being more proximate to the firm’s 
headquarters. This is due to the fact that most value relevant information is 
generated there, is often communicated in the firm’s home-country language, 
and is compiled in accordance with the firm’s home-country accounting 
standards (Halling et al, 2007), leaving the traders on the foreign exchange at 
an informational disadvantage. The implementation of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) by more than 120 countries, which constitutes 
one of the largest accounting regulatory changes to date, allows us to 
investigate the effect of accounting standards on the international flow of 
capital.  
Using a sample of 239 firms with level 2 or 3 ADRs from 31 countries 
of which 27 have adopted IFRS between 2003 and 2012, we find that IFRS 
adoption improves the liquidity of ADRs, in line with the reduction of the 
information disadvantage of investors trading on U.S. exchanges. Our results 
further indicate that the improvement in the liquidity of ADRs depend on the 
quality of the domestic legal and regulatory institutions. Tests aimed at 
identifying the source of the improvements do not reveal that the superior 
quality of IFRS relative to the pre-existing domestic GAAPs affect the 
liquidity improvements, but rather point towards the scale benefits that ensue 
from reducing the number of standards according to which cross-listed firms 
report. Collectively, our results imply that the adoption of IFRS in a U.S. 
cross-listed firm’s domestic market improves access to foreign markets which 
have not adopted the mandate and potentially U.S. investors’ capital allocation 
decisions, especially for those restricted to invest in securities on U.S. 
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exchanges. Our findings further speak to the role of accounting standards in 
the competition between stock exchanges.  
Finally, in chapter 43, I investigate whether the commitment to 
providing conservative accounting information disciplines the allocation of 
capital by managers. Extant empirical accounting research mostly focusses on 
the role of accounting in the supply of information for valuation and 
monitoring purposes, but (implicitly) regards the outcome of the underlying 
economic activity pursued by firms as independent of the accounting method 
used.  More recent work endogenizes the role of accounting by recognizing 
that the quality of information provision by firms can improve investment 
efficiency by mitigating both underinvestment, through reduction of 
information asymmetry between firms and external suppliers of capital, and 
overinvestment, by facilitating contracting and monitoring (Biddle and Hilary, 
2006; Biddle et al, 2009). This chapter extends this line of research by focusing 
on the role of accounting conservatism on investment efficiency, as despite 
the central role of conservatism in accounting, there are both contrasting 
theoretical predictions and mixed empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
conservatism on investment efficiency.  
Exploiting the staggered and unanticipated passage of state antitakeover laws 
in order to circumvent endogeneity concerns, I find evidence strongly in line 
with a disciplinary effect of conservatism on managerial investment discretion. 
More specifically, I find that investors react less negatively to an increase in 
managerial discretion for firms that report more conservatively. Using a 
difference-in-difference setup, I find that firms that report more 
conservatively do not increase their acquisition investments, while those 
                                                 
3 Pouyan Ghazizadeh has conducted the entire study. 
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reporting less conservatively do. Furthermore, while both the operating 
profitability, stock performance and riskiness of less conservatively reporting 
firms decline after increases in managerial discretion, more conservatively 
reporting firms’ performance is unaffected. Overall, the evidence of this 
chapter suggests that accounting conservatism mitigates inefficient investment 
that can be attributed to increased managerial discretion.  
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Chapter 2 
Voluntary Disclosures of Corporate Asset Sales4  
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter documents the pervasive use of voluntary disclosures used to 
inform the market of firms’ intentions to divest part of their operations. More 
specifically, using a novel hand-collected dataset, we document that in over 
40% of corporate asset sales, selling firms inform investors with respect to 
their intended transactions and that these announcements give rise to 
significant stock market reactions. We examine the factors that affect the 
selling firms’ decision to voluntarily disclose their intentions, as well as the 
capital market reactions that such disclosures bring about. 
Corporate asset sales are one of the most common ways productive 
assets are reallocated, making up approximately half of all M&A transactions 
(Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). Prior literature shows that asset sales are 
used to alter the scope of the firm’s activities (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 
2001, 2002), where assets are reallocated to firms that can deploy them more 
                                                 
4 This chapter is based on Ghazizadeh, P., A. de Jong, and F. P. Schlingemann. 2018. 
Voluntary disclosures of corporate asset sales. Working paper.  
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efficiently (Hite et al, 1987). Furthermore, asset sales serve as a primary source 
of financing (Lang et al, 1995; Bates, 2005, Arnold et al, 2017), enabling selling 
firms to focus their attention on activities where they can add most value. In 
line with these potential benefits, prior literature reports positive stock market 
reactions when firms announce asset sales (e.g., Jain, 1985). However, in order 
to correctly measure and interpret the market reactions to asset sales, it is 
crucial that the reactions include all relevant news about the deal. As our 
results indicate, however, in over 40% of asset sales the current literature does 
not take into account selling firms’ announcements about intended asset sales, 
which leads to the underestimation of the documented market reaction to 
asset sales. 
In addition to correctly measuring market reactions, the analysis of the 
decision to pre-announce that assets are put up for sale is important for 
several other reasons. First, the consideration that the selling firm receives is a 
crucial determinant of the decision to divest. In fact, selling firms’ managers 
may require a premium over the value of the asset under their management 
given their reluctance to relinquish control (Jensen, 1986). As the 
consideration is a function of the competitive bidding process, it is important 
to understand the process through which potential buyers are attracted. This 
process, however, is currently not well understood (Borisova et al, 2013). 
Potential buyers may have to incur high costs of gathering information 
regarding the quality of the assets put up for sale, as this information is often 
not publicly available. A public announcement that assets are available for sale 
can serve to reduce search costs and increase the pool of potential buyers, 
leading to a higher probability of a transaction and a higher price. Conversely, 
a public announcement could also lead to a poor negotiation position and a 
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lower transaction price, because the firm reveals the poor quality of the asset 
and weak managerial judgement in case the asset cannot be sold. As such, the 
analysis of pre-announcements is not only important from a measurement 
perspective, but also because it is an key component of the selling process and 
plausibly has an effect on the occurrence and pricing of the sale. Second, 
market reactions to asset sales are related to the information the sale reveals 
with regard to the remaining operations of the firm (Brown et al, 1994; 
Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). As we will discuss in more detail below, 
managers can use pre-announcements to signal the improved prospects of the 
firm’s remaining operations. If the decision to pre-announce asset sales is not 
well understood, the examination of market reactions to asset sales motivated 
by factors that also affect the decision to pre-announce, may lead to incorrect 
inferences, because the market reactions to these pre-announcements are not 
taken into account. 
We start our analysis by documenting the prevalence of pre-
announcements. Using a sample of 330 completed asset sales between 2005 
and 2015 by public parent firms incorporated in the US from non-financial 
and non-regulated industries, we find that 42% of asset sales are preceded by a 
public announcement of the intention to sell. As pre-announcements are more 
prevalent among larger deals (transactions preceded by an announcement are 
2.8 times larger than non-announced transactions), their value-weighted 
proportion equals 67%. We also investigate the market’s reaction to pre-
announcements and find that they elicit statistically and economically 
significant cumulative abnormal returns, which average 2.41% over a three-day 
event window. These abnormal returns constitute the largest market reaction 
to the events related to the asset sales in our sample, which further include the 
10 
 
reactions to the deal announcements of both pre-announced and non-pre-
announced asset sales. Overall, our results indicate that excluding the market 
reaction to pre-announcements entails an underestimation of the market 
reaction to asset sales of 40%. 
We then investigate the determinants of the decision to pre-announce 
a deal using probit analyses. The probability of a pre-announcement increases 
when managers have incentives to signal improved prospects of the remaining 
assets of the firm. In particular, we find that asset sales are more likely to be 
pre-announced when the selling firm’s stock has performed poorly in the year 
preceding the announcement, and when the growth opportunities of the 
industry of the remaining operations have received a positive shock. We find 
no evidence that managers use pre-announcements to signal the quality of the 
assets they plan to sell. We furthermore find that asset sales by larger firms 
and firms more dependent on external capital are more likely to be pre-
announced, as well as deals that constitute a larger proportion of the selling 
firm.  
Next, we study the market response to the announcements and its 
determinants. First, we find that the overall market reaction to pre-announced 
deals is more positive than to those which are not pre-announced. We then 
explore potential reasons for this finding. The results of our tests do 
consistently support the notion that pre-announcements are used to signal the 
turnaround of poor prior performance and financial distress. Furthermore, our 
results provide indications that non-pre-announced asset sales involve the sale 
of assets that are strongly sought after, potentially initiated by foreign bidders. 
These seemingly different incentives for the two types of asset sales are also in 
line with our main finding that markets react more positively to pre-
11 
 
announced deals than to non-pre-announced deals. In particular, pre-
announced deals bring the expectation that the future of the remaining 
operations will improve, which constitute the majority of operations of the 
selling firm. The returns to the non-pre-announced deals however seem to 
reflect only a premium paid for the disposed asset, which generally constitutes 
a minority part of the selling firm. Similar to the results of the probit analyses, 
we find no evidence that pre-announcements are used to signal the higher 
quality of the assets in play.  
Our results contribute to the literature that investigates asset sales. By 
documenting the prevalence of pre-announcements and the capital market 
reactions, we shed some light on the process of asset sales, which is 
characterized as highly opaque (Borisova et al, 2013), despite the large 
operational and financial effects of these transactions for the selling firms. 
More specifically, we show that the current literature underestimates the 
market reaction to asset sales by 40% when not taking into account the 
reactions to the pre-announcements. Furthermore, our results suggest that the 
decision to pre-announce is related to the motivation for the asset sale. Thus, 
the omission of the market reaction to pre-announcements could lead to 
wrong inferences. In this regard, we add to the findings of Brown et al (1994), 
who report that contrary to the results for healthy firms, returns to 
shareholders of financially distressed firms are significantly lower when asset 
sales proceeds are used to repay debt than when sales proceeds are retained by 
the firm. They ascribe this to pressure from short-term creditors who 
effectively expropriate wealth from shareholders; an important finding which 
speaks to far-reaching effects of conflicts of interest among different type of 
providers of capital. However, our results suggest that an alternative reason 
12 
 
for the lower returns could be that at least a subset of firms selling to avert 
financial distress has pre-announced the asset sale, which would result in the 
lower returns recorded when only measured at the time of the deal-
announcement.  
Our study also contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosures. 
First, several studies investigate the use of voluntary disclosures in M&A 
transactions (e.g., Amel-Zadeh and Meeks, 2015). Whereas the focus of these 
studies relates to either increases or positive biases of more general types of 
voluntary disclosures (i.e., earnings forecasts), we contribute by investigating a 
type of voluntary disclosure that is a direct part of the selling process. Second, 
our study contributes to the more general literature that investigates the 
determinants of voluntary disclosures. While the literature on voluntary 
disclosures is extensive, we believe that several aspects of our setting 
contribute to this literature. First, unlike most prior literature, we study a 
voluntary disclosure that is not recurring or, more specifically, sticky, which 
allows for a much better empirical identification. Second, the private 
information endowment of the manager in our setting is much less known to 
outsiders compared to the type of voluntary disclosures studied in the bulk of 
prior literature (i.e., earnings guidance). As such, the unraveling principle 
applies far less, rendering the disclosure in our setting much more voluntary. 
Third, while disclosure related costs are crucial theoretically (Verrecchia, 
1983), empirically identifying disclosures that carry significant proprietary 
costs is challenging (Beyer et al, 2010; Lang and Sul, 2014). Our study 
overcomes this shortcoming as the public announcement in our setting carries 
clear potential costs.  
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews prior literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
data. Section 4 and 5 present the empirical findings, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.2 Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Corporate asset sales are driven by both strategic and financial motives, and 
prior research documents that their announcements typically generate positive 
stock reactions (e.g., Hite et al, 1987; Borisova et al, 2013). The predominant 
neo-classical explanation offered for this positive reaction is twofold: asset 
sales enable the reallocation of assets to more efficient firms, where the seller 
can appropriate a fraction of the ensuing synergies through the bidding 
process (Hite et al, 1987), while the increase in focus leads to the improvement 
in the management of the remaining assets (John and Ofek, 1995). Other 
rationales relate the reaction to the alleviation of financial constraints (Lang et 
al, 1994; Bates, 2005; Arnold et al, 2017) and signals of improved governance 
(Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Boot, 1992). Moreover, Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2001, 2002) and Yang (2008) show that asset sales coincide with industry 
shocks and occur more often in industries with less persistent and more 
volatile productivity, while others provide evidence that assets sales are 
reactions to corporate control and shareholder activism (Berger and Ofek, 
1999).  
Irrespective of the rationale, asset sales alter the scope of the firm’s 
operations and financial structure, which in turn alter both the level and 
volatility of the selling firm’s cash flows. Given the importance of these 
parameters in the valuation of a firm’s stock, and the volatile circumstances 
14 
 
that are associated with asset sales, we argue that there is a strong demand for 
information regarding asset sales from investors. Prior theoretical work 
suggests that managers have an incentive to respond to the information 
demands of investors and reduce their estimation risk (e.g., Lambert et al, 
2007). A vast body of empirical evidence indicates that managers indeed take 
actions to improve their firms’ information environments by voluntary 
disclosure of private information. For example, Shroff et al (2013) find that 
firms increase their voluntary disclosures prior to raising capital and that these 
disclosures are associated with decreased information asymmetry and costs of 
raising capital; Anantharaman and Zhang (2011) and Balakrishnan et al (2014) 
find that in response to an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage managers 
increase the provision of voluntary disclosures; and Billings et al (2015) find 
that managers react to increased volatility by providing more voluntary 
disclosures5.  
While these findings speak to the benefits that can be reaped from 
voluntary disclosures, casual observation suggests that managers do not always 
disclose all private information, as implied by the unraveling principle 
(Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). This disconnect is most commonly 
attributed to the existence of disclosure-related costs (Verrecchia, 1983). 
However, although the proprietary-cost argument is intuitively appealing, 
empirical identification of disclosures that carry significant proprietary costs is 
challenging (Beyer et al, 2010; Lang and Sul, 2014). This implies for asset sales 
that managers with an informational advantage over investors have an 
                                                 
5 Another stream of studies investigates whether information intermediaries respond to 
investors’ information demands. E.g., DeFond and Hung (2003) report evidence that analysts 
provide cash flow forecasts in addition to earnings forecasts for firms in which the two 
forecasts are highly complementary. More related to this study, Gilson et al (2001) show that 
following focus increasing break-ups more and specialized analysts start providing coverage. 
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incentive to disclose their intention to sell part of the firm as long as the cost 
of doing so is lower than the benefits of providing such disclosure. In the 
development of our hypotheses, we distinguish between the potential effect 
that a public announcement may have on the deal itself, as well as how this 
disclosure speaks to the performance of the remaining assets of the firm.  
As mentioned previously, the comparative advantage of other firms in 
deploying assets provides a motive for firms  to sell assets, which allows the 
seller to appropriate a fraction of the ensuing efficiency gains through the 
competitive bidding process (Hite et al, 1987). In line with this, Maksimovic 
and Phillips (2001) show that assets are indeed more likely to be sold when 
they are less productive than their industry benchmarks and that most 
transactions result in productivity gains. Furthermore, these authors show that 
asset sales are more likely when the economy is undergoing positive demand 
shocks, as with increasing output prices more productive firms can extract 
more value from the assets they control, while less productive firms incur 
higher opportunity costs holding on to assets they are not best equipped to 
manage. Yang (2008) further shows that changes in firms’ productivity drive 
asset transfers, in particular firms with rising and falling productivity buy and 
sell assets, which leads to greater asset reallocation in industries in which firms 
have less persistent productivity.  
Given that both supply and demand of assets increase with changing 
economic conditions and volatility of firms’ productivity, firm that aim to buy 
assets incur high search costs in their attempts to find a suitable target. This is 
further exacerbated by the fact that public information regarding the quality of 
an asset in play is often sparsely available prior to a sale, as reporting 
requirements regarding specific parts of firms are less stringent than those 
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required for the firm as a whole, and firms may be disinclined to voluntarily 
provide such detailed information for competitive reasons (e.g., Botosan and 
Stanford, 2005). As such, any potential buyer runs a risk that the quality of the 
asset they were planning to acquire based on publicly available information 
differs markedly from that based on more private information. This risk is 
plausibly higher during changing conditions, as the already limited public 
information regarding the asset is more likely to be stale.  
We argue that some firms looking to appropriate part of the efficiency 
gains from asset sales can use a public announcement that an asset is for sale 
as a signal of its quality, and improve the competitive bidding process. More 
specifically, in line with adverse selection models (Akerlof, 1970), we propose 
that the informationally disadvantaged buyers pool the assets available for sale, 
giving the sellers of high quality assets an incentive to separate themselves 
from the sellers of low quality assets. Note that in our setting, a low quality 
asset refers to an asset for which the public valuation is higher that its 
valuation based on private information regarding both its current and potential 
productivity, while this does not hold for a high quality asset. In order to be 
credible, the signal needs to carry a cost, to which the sellers of high quality 
assets are less sensitive. A public announcement meets this requirement, given 
that it could lead to a poor negotiation position and lower transaction price for 
sellers of low quality assets. Additional costs of a public announcement 
include the disruptive effects of knowledge of the potential sale of part of the 
firm – or simply uncertainty regarding its future – on the firm’s customers, 
suppliers or key employees (Gole and Hilger, 2008). That is, while the initial 
search for potential assets to acquire occurs with buyers at a large information 
disadvantage relative to the sellers, buyers eventually get access to private 
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information (e.g., additional rounds of due diligence, management 
presentations, site visits and restricted access to the seller’s data rooms). A gap 
between publicly available information about the asset’s quality and the actual 
quality of the asset will lower the probability of a transaction and reduce the 
consideration paid for the asset. A reduced consideration will elicit a negative 
market response as investors will revise their valuation of the asset6. The 
failure to sell an asset put up for sale is likely to be taken as a strong negative 
signal regarding the quality of the asset in play. As such, sellers of high quality 
assets can signal their type by publicly announcing their intention to sell a 
certain asset. Note that this signal is received both by financial markets, 
resulting in a positive reaction at the time of the announcement, as well as by 
real markets, where potential buyers should be less concerned with the risk of 
expending time and effort on a futile bidding process. The latter is expected to 
lead to more potential buyers7, which in turn should heighten the competitive 
bidding process, allowing the seller to appropriate a larger portion of the 
efficiency gains. Furthermore, outsiders’ concerns about the gap between 
publicly available information on the asset’s quality and the actual quality of 
the asset will be larger for firms with less persistent productivity. We thus 
propose that the benefits of a signal provided by the  public announcement 
                                                 
6 It is in fact likely that a reduced consideration will not only affect the market’s valuation of 
the sold asset, but that it causes investors to revisit their priors regarding the remaining 
operations of the selling firm as it could cast doubt regarding the quality of the information 
provided by the selling firm.  
7 Note that publicly announcing that an asset is in play should in and of itself increase the 
number of potential buyers by simply ensuring that more potential buyers are aware of the 
availability of the asset. This is particularly important in the setting of asset sales, as – contrary 
to full mergers – asset sales do not require shareholder approval (Hege et al, 2013), which 
allows for substantial managerial discretion over whether and which assets to sell. 
Furthermore, an additional benefit of a public announcement is that boards, which in case of 
selling part of the firm have a fiduciary duty to obtain the highest price reasonably available, 
can be satisfied to have met their duties (Rosenbaum and Pearl, 2009).  
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should be decreasing in the extent of the persistence of the asset’s 
productivity. 
In addition argument on the appropriation of the efficiency gain 
described above, prior literature has ascribed some of the positive reactions to 
asset sales to the information that such a transaction reveals of the remaining 
operations of the firm. Firstly, the sale of underperforming assets rids the 
selling firm from the culprit to its poor performance, andalso facilitates 
improvements to its remaining assets. In particular, reducing the scope of the 
firm’s activity enables firms to focus managerial attention on the remaining 
activities. Secondly, asset sales could reflect selling firms’ improved outlooks. 
More specifically, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that while firms sell 
assets from their peripheral and less efficient operations, they do so especially 
after a positive shock to their core and more efficient operations. Coupled 
with the reduction of financial constraints resulting from the consideration 
received as part of the transaction8, asset sales facilitate the pursuit of more 
value enhancing projects. In line with both arguments, John and Ofek (1995) 
report that asset sales lead to improved operating performance of the 
remaining assets, while Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) and Colak and Whited 
(2007) further show that sellers improve their investment efficiency after 
divestitures. As such, in addition to signaling the quality of the asset available 
for sale, a public announcement of an intended asset sale can also signal the 
quality of the selling firm’s remaining operations9. In this case, the credibility 
                                                 
8 Asset sales serve as a key source of financing (Lang et al, 1995; Bates, 2005, Arnold et al, 
2017). For instance, Arnold et al (2017, p. 1) report that “the average proceeds from fixed asset sales 
correspond to roughly 44% of the average net amount of newly issued equity for U.S. manufacturing firms in 
COMPUSTAT between 1971 and 2010”. 
9 Effectively, an asset sale itself could be considered a signal regarding the improved outlook 
of the remaining operations. This does not materially affect our analysis given that a public 
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of the signal is derived from the proprietary nature of such announcements: 
prior work shows that revealing good news regarding prospects of an industry 
may attract new entrants (Verrecchia, 1990; Dedman and Lennox, 2009), or 
elicit reaction by firms already operating there (Wagenhoger, 1990; Durnev 
and Mangen, 2009). Given the threshold these costs impose, the private 
information regarding the improved prospects must be sufficiently large to 
merit its public disclosure (Verreccia, 1983)10.  
Based on the above, we formulate the following hypotheses on the 
probability that firms pre-announce an intended asset sale:  
H1:   The probability of an asset sale being pre-announced is 
negatively related to the persistence of the productivity of the sold 
assets. 
H2:   The probability of an asset sale being pre-announced is 
negatively related to the selling firm’s past performance. 
H3:   The probability of an asset sale being pre-announced is 
positively related to the prospects of the selling firm’s remaining 
operations. 
We then turn to our expectations of  stock market reactions to asset 
sale information: 
                                                                                                                           
announcement can then be considered as the credible expedition of that signal – our 
expectation of a positive relationship between the stock market reactions and the selling firm’s 
remaining operations would include those of non-announced asset sales, but still be more 
pronounced for pre-announced asset sales.  
10 The incentive to provide such a signal can be related to managers’ career concerns, which 
will be elaborated below. Issuance of external capital may further incentivize the public 
disclosure.  
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H4:   The stock market reactions to pre-announced asset sales are 
more positive than to non-pre-announced asset sales. 
H5:   The stock market reactions to pre-announced asset sales are 
negatively related to the persistence of the productivity of the sold 
assets. 
H6:   The stock market reactions to pre-announced asset sales are 
negatively related to the selling firm’s past performance. 
H7:   The stock market reactions to pre-announced asset sales are 
positively related to the prospects of the selling firm’s remaining 
operations. 
 
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Sample Selection 
We draw our sample from the Mergers and Acquisition database available 
from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC). We select all completed 
divestitures from January 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2015 by public firms 
incorporated in the US, with a deal value of at least $50 million. Following 
previous studies (e.g., Schlingemann et al, 2002) we exclude deals of regulated 
utilities (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999). This leads to a 
preliminary sample of 2409 deals. We match this sample with Compustat 
(annual and segment files) and the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and require that data necessary to construct the variables of interest 
(discussed below in more detail) is not missing. We further drop deals where 
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the cusip code of the seller and target are the same, and require that the 
relative deal size (defined as the proportion of deal value to the market value 
of equity at the end of previous fiscal year) is at least 5% (unless the deal value 
is higher than $1 billion) and not larger than 90%. These steps reduce our 
sample to 770 deals.  
We manually look up the deals in Factiva, most importantly to 
determine whether the selling firm has pre-announced the intention to sell the 
asset in question. Using the information retrieved from Factiva, we further 
clean the sample in the following ways: (1) we confirm that the date the deal-
announcement was made public as reported in SDC, (2) we verify that the deal 
is an asset sale (we drop spinoffs, carve outs, asset swaps, sale and leaseback 
transactions, sale of real-estate, and drop-down acquisitions), (3) we confirm 
that the pre-announcement was made voluntarily, which entails that we drop 
deals that were preceded by rumors, were mandated by the FTC11, or were 
part of a bankruptcy12, (4) we drop deals that coincide with other major events 
other than quarterly earnings announcements (e.g., acquisitions by selling 
firm), and (5) we drop deals that were part of a general divestiture plan13. 
Finally, we manually link the sold asset to its reported segment using 10-K 
                                                 
11 In order to approve a merger, FTC often demands that a party to the proposed merger 
divests operations where the combination would otherwise gain too much market power. In 
these cases it is public knowledge which assets are to be divested, while the seller has not 
voluntary offered this information. Also, the information on the deal cannot be disentangled 
from the consequences of the merger that given the asset sale can follow.   
12 It is mandated by the Chapter 11 proceedings to publicly look for potential buyers, even for 
assets that are already pursued by potential buyers. The same arguments as above dictate the 
omission of these deals.  
13 This is the case when a firm announces plans to divest a certain dollar amount of asset sales, 
without specifying which assets will be sold. Generally, these plans involve the sale of multiple 
assets. Given the substantial dollar amount s that are involved, these plans generate large 
market reactions. Empirically, this poses a problem as the market’s reaction to the sale of a 
certain asset cannot be disentangled from other assets that are sold as part of the same plan.  
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fillings available on EDGAR. This procedures leads to a final sample to 330 
deals, of which 139 are pre-announced.  
The annual distribution of the number of deals and total deal values of 
the asset sales in our sample, delineated by whether they were preceded by a 
public announcement of the intention to be sold (henceforth: deal type), is 
depicted in Figure 1. The results imply that the incidence of non-pre-
announced deals is much more stable than pre-announced deals, which seem 
to be positively related to economic conditions.   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
2.3.2 Stock Performance Measurement 
We identify the public announcements of intended deals (pre-announcements) 
and add the event and the time that elapses until the public announcement 
regarding a definitive transaction agreement (deal announcement) to our 
analysis of asset sales. More specifically, we measure the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) to the pre-announcement, and also the selling firm’s stock 
performance during the time the market is aware of a possible transaction (so-
called between period), which is potentially related to the CAR of the 
announcements of the intention and realization. Note however that this 
period is only available for pre-announced deals14.  
                                                 
14 To facilitate comparability, we take the mean duration of the between period of the pre-
announced deals (i.e., 178 days) as the length of the in-between period for all non-pre-
announced deals. As such, we also measure the performance of the selling firm prior to the 
asset sales at a different point in time than the extant literature. 
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To measure the market reaction to an asset sale, we construct the 
three-day CAR ([-1; +1] windows) for the selling firm around both 
announcements using Eventus (PreAnn_CAR and Deal_CAR, respectively). 
For pre-announced deals, we also sum the CAR of both events to capture the 
total market reaction (Total_CAR). In line with conventional event-study 
methodology, we use the market-model specification with the CRSP value-
weighted index as the market portfolio, with market model parameters 
estimated over the window from 300 to 46 trading days prior to the event.  
We further measure the compounded returns of the selling firms’ 
stocks prior to and during the period between the pre-announcement and the 
deal announcenemt. More specifically, as argued above, past performance is a 
potential determinant of both the probability of a pre-announcement and the 
market’s reaction to information pertaining to asset sales. As such, we measure 
the buy-and-hold abnormal returns to the selling firm in the year preceding 
returns and up to two trading days prior to the pre-announcement15, and 
winsorize this at 1st and 99th percentiles (Ex-ante_BHAR). Furthermore, the 
market may adjust its initial reaction to the pre-announcement during the 
between period as more information regarding the deal is disseminated (e.g., 
updates regarding the deal are often provided during conference calls), while 
this information could also affect the market’s reaction to the deal-
announcement. As such, we measure the buy-and-hold abnormal returns to 
the selling firm over the two days after the pre-announcement and two days 
prior the deal-announcement for pre-announced deals (Runup). To facilitate a 
comparison we use  178 days prior and up to two days before the deal-
                                                 
15 For non-pre-announced deals, we measure the one year buy-and-hold returns up to 178 
days (sample average of the time between pre-announcement and deal-announcement of pre-
announced deals) prior to the deal-announcement.  
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announcement for the non-pre-announced deals, winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentiles.  
 
2.3.3.Other Variables and Summary Statistics  
We proxy the persistence of the productivity of sold assets (Persistence) 
following Yang (2008) and estimate the coefficient of a regression of firms' 
productivity on their one-year lagged productivity within each target's two-
digit SIC industry over the 1998-2016 period, where productivity is measured 
as operating income after depreciation divided by total assets16. Note that this 
measure is constant at the target’s two-digit SIC industry.  
To capture changes in the prospects of the selling firm’s remaining 
operations, we construct an indicator variable IndShock, which takes on the 
value of one in case the selling firm operates in multiple industries and any of 
its remaining operation's industry receives a positive demand shock, and zero 
otherwise. A positive demand shock is an indicator variable if the growth of 
the Tobin's q17 of an industry's single industry firms is in the highest quintile 
over the 1980-2016 period, and zero otherwise. 
We further control for other observable firm characteristics, which 
previous literature has shown to be associated with voluntary disclosures. In 
particular, given that larger firms are more likely to provide voluntary 
disclosures (Bamber and Cheon, 1998), we include a proxy for firm size, 
(ln)MVE, constructed as the firm market value of equity at the end of the 
                                                 
16 In line with Yang (2008), we delete industries with less than 50 observations, after requiring 
that each firm occurs at least 5 times in the sample period to obtain a stable time series. 
17 Tobin’s q is measured as ((at - ceq)+(prcc_f*csho))/at 
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previous fiscal year end. Based on Welker (1995) and Frankel et al (1995) we 
include a proxy for industry reliance on external financing (ExtFinDep), which 
we measure as the ranking of the two-digit SIC industry median need for 
external financing ([capx – oancf]/capx) of all firms in the industry over the 
1994-2004 period following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Acharya and Xu 
(2017). We also include Leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to book 
value of total asset ((dlc+dltt)/at), to capture any differential demand for 
voluntary disclosures by providers of capital to the firm (Vashishtha, 2014). In 
line with Johnson et al (2001), we proxy a firm’s exposure to litigation risk 
(Litigious) as an indicator variable that takes on the value of one in case the 
selling firm belongs to industries prone to litigation risk, i.e. computer 
hardware (SIC codes 3570–3577), computer software (SIC codes 7371–7379), 
or pharmaceuticals (SIC codes 2833–2836) industries, and zero otherwise. We 
furthermore construct a variable that captures the profitability of the selling 
firm and sold asset (Profit), as it has been shown to affect disclosure decisions 
(Dedman and Lennox, 2009). 
Finally, we measure several characteristics of the deals in our sample. 
Our main variable of interest is PreAnn – an indicator variable that takes on 
the value of one in case the deal was pre-announced, and zero otherwise. We 
measure the consideration paid in millions of U.S. dollars (Deal Value), and 
calculate the ratio of the deal value to the seller's market value of equity at the 
end of the previous fiscal year end (Relative Size). Given that announcements 
may be bundled with other news, we create the indicator variables 
ConcurrentInfo-Deal and ConcurrentInfo-PreAnn, which take on the value of one in 
case the deal announcement or pre-announcement, respectively, was within 
one day of the reporting date of quarterly earnings announcements, and zero 
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otherwise. ConcurrentInfo is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one 
in case either the deal- or the pre-announcement was within one day of the 
reporting date of quarterly earnings announcements, and zero otherwise. For 
pre-announced deals, we measure the time in days between the pre-
announcement and the deal-announcement (Time-to-Completion). Related Asset is 
an indicator variable that takes on the value of one in case the two-digit SIC 
industry of the asset sold equals that of the seller, and zero otherwise. We 
create several variables aimed to capture the characteristics of the buyers. 
More specifically, we create an indicator variable that takes on the value of one 
in case the two-digit SIC industry of the asset sold equals that of the buyer, 
and zero otherwise (Intra-industry). Similarly, Foreign Buyer is an indicator 
variable that takes on the value of one in case the buyer is not a U.S. listed 
firm, and zero otherwise. We further refine the possible categories by 
partitioning Intra-industry and Foreign Buyer into six non-overlapping subsets of 
binary indicator variables. More specifically, we distinguish between intra-
industry buyers which share the same two-digit SIC code as the asset sold 
(Inside), financial buyers with SIC codes 6000-6999 (Financial), and non-
financial inter-industry buyers which do not share the two-digit SIC code of 
the asset sold (Outside), for both U.S. listed firms (Domestic) and non-U.S. listed 
firms (Foreign). Table 1 summarizes deal and firm characteristics of the full 
sample.  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
The mean of PreAnn indicates that 42% of asset sales are pre-
announced, which shows the pervasiveness of prior information dissemination 
by firms in the market of corporate asset sales and the empirical importance of 
taking into account these pre-announcements. The sample average of Deal 
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Value equals $745 million, which translates into an average Relative Size of 
21%. In line with managers having more discretion regarding the timing of the 
pre-announcement, the results in Table 1 indicate that 36% of pre-
announcements are bundled with earnings announcement, whereas only 16% 
of deal announcements coincide with earnings announcements. Furthermore, 
the average (median) pre-announcement precedes the deal-announcement by 
178 (139) days. The results in Table 1 further show that 75% of the deals in 
our sample involve the sale of assets from the same industry as the seller. The 
buyers in our sample are from the same industry as the sold asset in 48% of 
the time, while firms not listed in the U.S. are the buyers in 27% of the sales. 
Turning to selling firm characteristics, the results indicate that the distribution 
of MVE is skewed, and that in line with expectations, asset sales are preceded 
by negative stock performance.   
  
2.4 Determinants of pre-announcement 
2.4.1 Bivariate Analysis 
As a first step in our analysis of the determinants of pre-announcement, we 
compare deal and firm characteristics across the two deal types and report the 
results in Table 2. Importantly, we find that on average pre-announced deals 
are 2.8 times larger than non-pre-announced deals. This is in line with 
attempts to increase the pool of potential buyers: a key determinant of the 
number of potential buyers is the financial ability of potential buyers to 
acquire a selling firm’s assets, which is negatively related to the size of the 
intended deal (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). The difference in the relative size of 
the deals however is statistically indistinguishable from zero, entailing that pre-
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announcing firms are on average larger. Furthermore, the significant 
difference between the deal values implies that the value-weighted proportion 
of pre-announced asset sales equals 67%. The results in Table 2 further 
indicate that pre-announced deals more often involve assets from the same 
industry as the seller. This finding refutes the expectation that pre-
announcements are instigated by improved prospects in the selling firm’s 
remaining operations. Furthermore, while the proportion of assets acquired by 
foreign and within-industry buyers does not differ significantly, significant 
differences across buyers emerge when refining these categories. More 
specifically, the results show that pre-announced deals significantly more often 
involve a U.S. listed financial buyer, while they end up being acquired 
significantly less often by domestic buyers that do not operate in the same 
industry.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 provides an overview of the characteristics of the selling firms. 
As expected based on average deal value and the relative size of the 
transactions, pre-announcing firms are significantly larger than their non-pre-
announcing counterparts. Importantly, we find that firms that pre-announce 
their asset sales have worse stock performance prior to the pre-announcement 
than their non-pre-announcing counterparts. More specifically, the results 
show that pre-announcing firms underperform non-pre-announcing firms by a 
statistically and economically significant 7.5%. Note that in the runup period, 
the returns no longer differ, which entails that relative to the non-pre-
announcing sample the stock returns of the pre-announcing firms have 
improved. Also in line with our expectations, the remaining operations of 
selling firms more often receive a positive shock in pre-announced deals. 
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Contrary to our expectations however, the difference in the means of 
Persistence across the two sample is not statistically different from zero. 
Furthermore, pre-announcing firms more often operate in industries that rely 
on external capital, which is in line with Frankel et al (1995) who report a 
positive association between firm’s tendency to access capital markets and 
disclosure of information. Note however that at the firm level no difference 
on the use of external (debt) can be discerned. Finally, the results presented in 
Table 2 show that the pre-announcing firms have similar exposures to 
litigation risk, and, contrary to the buy-and-hold abnormal returns prior to the 
pre-announcement, are average more profitable than non-pre-announcing 
firms. Overall, we find that pre-announced asset sales involve larger deals in 
absolute value, conducted by firms with poorer stock performance and more 
improved prospects in their remaining operations.  
 
2.4.2 Probit Regressions 
As the second step in our analysis of the determinants of pre-announcement, 
we estimate the following probit regression: 
Pr(PreAnn = 1) = β0 + β1Persistence + β2Ex-ante_BHAR + β3IndShock + 
Ziγ + εi                           (1) 
where the coefficients on Persistence, Ex-ante_BHAR and IndShock are aimed at 
testing hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 respectively, Zi denotes publicly known 
and exogenous control variables as discussed in section III, γ is a vector of 
probit coefficients, and εi is orthogonal to public variables Zi.  
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Table 3 shows estimation results for the specification that models the 
decision of a manager to disclose an intended transaction. Given that Persistence 
could not be estimated for all observations, we run our probit specification in 
stages: the first three models in Table 3 report the results of the probit 
regressions with either Persistence, Ex-ante_BHAR or IndShock, where all models 
do include the full set of the control variables discussed previously. We then 
run an unrestricted model, which includes all the variables. As the estimated 
coefficients across the models, i.e. model (4) vs models (1), (2) or (3), are 
effectively identical, we will discuss the results of model (4).  
The estimated coefficient on Persistence, aimed to capture manager’s 
attempt to signal the quality of the asset in play, is not significantly different 
from zero and we thus find no evidence in line with H1. Our explanation for 
this is that managers do not use pre-announcements to signal the quality of 
the average deal, where the cost of disclosing could outweigh the benefits. More 
specifically, when assets’ productivity levels are volatile, the interest in those 
assets may vary as well, increasing the likelihood of not finding a buyer. This 
increases the cost of a pre-announcement, and the average deal may not 
involve assets of sufficiently high quality to overcome this threshold.  
While the estimated coefficient on Persistence is inconsistent with the 
predictions from our hypotheses, the estimated coefficients on Ex-
ante_BHAR and IndShock are consitent. More specifically, the estimated 
coefficient on Ex-ante_BHAR, our variable on interest for testing H2, is 
negative and significant (-0.473, t-value: -2.04), in line with the argument that 
managers that sell a part of the firm that contributes to the poor past 
performance have an incentive to promptly inform markets of this. The 
estimated coefficient on IndShock, our variable on interest for testing H3, is 
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positive and significant (0.564, t-value: 2.77), which is in line with managers 
precipitously informing markets or their plans to sell assets when the 
prospects of their remaining operations improve. The effects of these 
variables are also economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in 
Ex-ante_BHAR increases the probability of pre-announcing an asset sale by 
5.5%, while selling firms which have received a positive demand shock to any 
of their remaining operation's industry are 19% more likely to pre-announce 
intended asset sales.  
Of the additional variables, Size, Relative Size and ExtFinDep have 
significant effects on the decision to pre-announce the sale of assets. The 
positive coefficient of Size indicates that larger firms are more likely to pre-
announce intended asset sales. We offer two explanations for this. First, it is 
relatively less costly for large firms to provide disclosures (Bamber and Cheon, 
1998). Second, due to our sample selection criteria (i.e., deal value is required 
to be at least 5% of the seller’s market value of equity) assets sold by larger 
firms in our sample are larger. As there are fewer potential buyers for large 
assets, the benefits of a pre-announcement may be larger for larger firms. We 
also provide two explanations for the positive coefficient of Relative Size. First, 
the importance to inform investors in a timely fashion is positively related to 
the materiality of the information which is in turn increasing in the relative 
size of firm’s operations that are discontinued. Second, and more related to 
our hypotheses, the relative size of the asset sale is likely to be positively 
related to the expected improvements in the remaining firm’s operations. That 
is, in case the sold asset is the culprit to the negative past performance of the 
selling firm, the improvement post-sale should be increasing in the size of the 
sold asset. In case the asset is sold due to improved prospects of the remaining 
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operations of the firm, the willingness to sell a large portion of the firm is both 
a stronger signal, as well as a larger influx of capital which can be used to 
finance growth opportunities. Finally, the positive coefficient of ExtFinDep is 
in line with Frankel et al (1995) who report a positive association between 
firm’s tendency to access capital markets and disclosure of information. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
2.5 Stock Market Reaction to Pre-announcements and Deals 
In this section, we report and compare the stock market’s reaction to the pre- 
and deal-announcements. The first column of Table 4 (Panel A) reports the 
average cumulative abnormal return to the deal-announcement for the entire 
sample (i.e., both the pre-announced and non-pre-announced deals), similar to 
the previous literature. The magnitude of the market’s reaction (1.54%) is 
similar to those reported in other studies (e.g., Borisova et al, 2013), and 
confirms that asset sales evoke a positive reaction by shareholders. However, 
when we distinguish between the returns to pre-announced and non-pre-
announced deals, we find that the deal-announcement returns to pre-
disclosing firms are less than half of those that accrue to the non-pre-
disclosing firms (0.88% vs 2.02%). The returns on the pre-announcement, 
however, are significantly larger than those on the deal-announcement for the 
pre-announced deals (2.41%), which translates into an underestimation of 
market reaction to the full sample of asset sales of 40%. Also, note that the 
pre-announced deals are much larger than their non-pre-announced 
counterparts, rendering the omission of this part of the market’s reaction to 
asset sales even more economically significant. The difference between the 
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market’s reaction to the pre-announcement and deal-announcement entails 
that markets not only consider the disclosure of the intention to sell to be 
value-relevant news, but also deem the completion of the deal as very likely as 
they incorporate over 70% of the total effect on the pre-announcement date. 
Nevertheless, despite the market’s positive reaction to the pre-announcement, 
the sum of the announcement period returns to the pre-announcement and 
the deal-announcement (3.29%) is not significantly larger than the market’s 
reaction to non-pre-announced deals. The results of the statistical tests of 
these comparisons are reported in Panel B. The results in Panels C and D of 
Table 4 further show that the buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the runup 
period for the two type of deals do not differ significantly from zero or each 
other.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
We next investigate whether the stock market reactions to pre-
announced asset sales are more positive than non-pre-announced asset sales 
after controlling for other determinants of market reactions to asset sales (H4). 
We estimate the following OLS regression model on the full sample of asset 
sales, where the coefficient on PreAnn captures the difference in the market 
reaction between the two type of deals: 
Total_CAR =  β0  + β1PreAnn + β2Persistence + β3Ex-ante_BHAR + 
β4IndShock + β5(ln)MVE  + β6Relative Size + β7Litigious + 
β8ExtFinDep + β9Leverage + β10Profit + β11Related Asset + 
β12Intra-industry + β13Foreign Buyer +ε              (2) 
We add Persistence, Ex-ante_BHAR and IndShock, as these are the 
variables that capture managerial signaling incentives. We further control for 
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the relative size of the sale (Relative Size), to capture the change in the scope of 
the selling firms activities, as well as size ((ln)MVE) and exposure to litigation 
risk (Litigious). As market reactions to asset sales have been shown to be 
associated with selling firms’ demand for external capital (e.g., Asquith et al, 
1994; Lang et al, 1995; Bates, 2005), we further add ExtFinDep, Leverage, and 
Profit to our specification. Given that announcements may be bundled with 
other news, we also include ConcurrentInfo to the regression model. Finally, we 
control for the type of asset that has been sold (Related Asset)  and type of 
buyer (Intra-industry and Foreign Buyer). We further include year fixed effects, as 
the market reaction to asset sales may vary systematically with macroeconomic 
conditions18. The construction of variables is discussed in section III.  
The results of our main specification are reported in Model 3 of Table 
5. The positive and significant coefficient of PreAnn indicates that, in line with 
our expectations, the market reacts more positively to pre-announced deals. In 
particular, keeping other determinants of market reaction to asset sales 
constant, pre-announced asset sales elicit an economically significant 2.1% 
larger CAR relative to non-pre-announced asset sales. Thus, the positive 
association between the CAR and pre-announcing asset sales supports the idea 
that managers act on their incentives to expedite the disclosure of positive 
news. The results reported in Table 5 further indicate that markets react 
significantly more positively when the selling firm’s stock performance in the 
year preceding the runup was negative and a larger proportion of the firm is 
divested. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient of IndShock is 
statistically and economically significantly negative, entailing that asset sales 
that coincide with a positive shock to the firm’s remaining operations elicit a 
                                                 
18 Our results are robust to the inclusion of industry fixed effects.  
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2.8% lower CAR. Our results also do not indicate that the persistence of the 
productivity of the sold assets affect investors’ reactions.  Furthermore, the 
negative coefficient of ConcurrentInfo implies that the markets reacts less 
positively when announcements regarding asset sales are bundled with 
earnings announcements. Finally, our results do not show that market 
reactions differ with either the type of asset which is sold (Related Asset), or 
type of buyer, regarding industry classification or nationality (Intra-industry and 
Foreign Buyer, respectively). Given evidence to the contrary (e.g., Borisova et al, 
2013), we further refine the type of buyers (see Model 4), but our inferences 
remain the same.        
 [Insert Table 5 here] 
 We next proceed by investigating the determinants of the market 
reactions to all announcements by estimating a modified version of our main 
regression model for each event separately. Model 1 of Table 6 (Panel A) 
shows the results of the estimated coefficients for the market reactions to the 
pre-announcements. Consistent with earlier findings, the persistence of the 
productivity of the sold assets affect investors’ reactions is not related to the 
market reactions at the time of the pre-announcement. Inconsistent with the 
predictions from our hypotheses, a concurrent positive shock to the remaining 
operation of the selling firm has a significantly negative effect on the market’s 
reaction to the news of intended asset sales. Nevertheless, taken together the 
signs of the other significant coefficients in Model 1 strongly supports the idea 
that managers pre-announce asset sales that are aimed to turn around poor 
prior performance and financial distress. More specifically, the estimated 
coefficient of Ex-ante_BHAR is statistically significantly negative, implying 
that market reactions to pre-announcement are higher the more poorly the 
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selling firm’s stock performs in the year preceding the pre-announcement. 
This coefficient (-0.04) is also economically significant: a one standard 
deviation increase in Ex-ante_BHAR translates into a 1.3% higher CAR. This 
result is especially noteworthy given that the pre-announcement only reveals 
intended asset sales. This interpretation is further supported by the negative 
coefficient of Profit. In the same vein, when the pre-announcement is bundled 
with earnings announcement (ConcurrentInfo_PreAnn), the CAR are 3.3% lower 
– which equals the mean value of Total_CAR for the entire sample of pre-
announced asset sales. In line with these results that suggest poor 
performance, we interpret the significantly positive coefficient of Leverage as 
shareholders of highly levered firms reacting positively to the possibility of an 
asset sale to avert bankruptcy. In particular, as Asquith et al (1994) show, asset 
sales are a way financially distressed firms can avoid bankruptcy, but firms in 
highly leveraged industries are limited in doing so. As argued in section II, the 
costs accompanying a pre-announcement render it credible, thus alleviating 
concerns shareholders may have that asset sales are not a viable option. 
Finally, although the coefficient of Relative Size is insignificant, its deviation 
from its coefficient in the other models and our prior that selling a larger 
proportion of the firm would elicit a more positive reaction, merits further 
discussion. A plausible reason for the near negative coefficient is that the size 
of asset sale offers new information to the market as to the gravity of the 
selling firm’s underlying issues.  
When turning to the results of Model 2, where the dependent variable 
is Deal_CAR and the sample consists of the pre-announced asset sales, the 
low explanatory power of the model is of note. More specifically, whereas the 
adjusted R2 of Model 1 – a regression estimated on the market reactions to 
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planned asset sales – equals 18,7%, the adjusted R2 of Model 2 – a regression 
run on market reactions to actual asset sales that were pre-announced – equals 
-1.9%. In fact, in Model 2 no variable other than Ex-ante_BHAR is 
significantly related to the market reaction. The stark difference between the 
explanatory power of the two models, coupled with the results presented in 
Table 4  suggests that the market deems pre-announcements credible and that 
most of the implications of the asset sale are priced in at the time of the pre-
announcement. Another potential reason for the low explanatory power of the 
Model 2 could be that in addition to pre-announcement, the transaction is 
highly anticipated. We therefore augment our main specification with 
PreAnn_CAR, Runup and (ln)Time-to-Completion (Model 3), and find that this 
substantially increases the model’s explanatory power to 5.9%, although it still 
remains well below that of Model 1. The significant positive coefficient of 
PreAnn_CAR is in line with diminished uncertainty when the deal is 
announced, while the significantly negative coefficient of Runup indicates that 
indeed the deal has been anticipated during the runup period. Note that an 
alternative interpretation of the negative coefficient of Runup would be that 
the poor stock performance continues in the runup period. In Model 4 we 
further refine our proxies of the type of buyer, but the inferences remain 
unchanged.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The results of Model 5, where the sample consists of the asset sales 
that were not pre-announced, further underline the difference between the 
two type of transactions. In particular, the insignificant coefficients of 
Persistence, Ex-ante_BHAR and IndShock are in line with the absence of any 
signaling incentives. Furthermore, it is striking that none of the factors which 
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determine the market reaction to either type of deal affect the market reaction 
to the other type, or in case of Leverage even has a significant effect in the 
opposite direction. Taken together, the results are in line with the idea that 
non-pre-announced asset sales are not aimed at turning around the 
performance of the firm or pursue more profitable growth opportunities 
available to the firm, and are potentially initiated by foreign bidders who 
diversify their operations in the U.S. and are willing to pay a high premium for 
those assets19. More specifically, the insignificant coefficients of Ex-
ante_BHAR, Profit, and ConcurrentInfo_Deal run counter to the notion that the 
sale was prompted to turnaround prior poor performance, while the negatively 
significant coefficient of Leverage is in line with the idea that deals by selling 
firms not in financial distress, thus enjoying a strong bargaining position, 
generate higher stock market reactions. The results also do not support the 
notion that the sale is instigated by the intention to reallocate focus and 
resources towards projects in other areas that hold more promise. As such, 
these findings cast doubt on the argument that these assets sales are motivated 
by the seller. Together with the significantly positive coefficients on Foreign 
Buyer and Relative Size20, the results suggest that these asset sales involve assets 
that were sought after and were initiated by foreign bidders. When we further 
refine the type of buyers in Model 6, the results indicate the foreign buyers 
from industries other that the target drive the positive market reactions. 
                                                 
19 Alternatively, the results in no way indicate that the positive market reactions are due to the 
information the deal reveals about the prospects of the remaining assets of the firm, while 
they are in line with the seller being able to receive a high value for the assets they sell.  
20 An unanticipated asset sale could elicit a negative market reaction, as it could be construed 
as negative information regarding the quality of the asset the market was not privy to. 
However, when the consideration is higher than the perceived market value of those assets, a 
positive relationship between Relative Size and Deal_CAR is likely to ensue.  
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We repeat our analyses of the determinants of the market reaction to 
the two deal types where we replace the dependent variable from the previous 
section (PreAnn_CAR in Model 1 and Deal_CAR in Models 2 - 4) with 
Total_CAR. The results of these tests are reported in Panel B of Table 6. Note 
that Model 4 and 5 are the same as Model 5 and 6 of Panel A, and are 
included to facilitate comparisons. The results of Model 1, 2, and 3 do not 
change our previously stated interpretations. The coefficient of 
Foreign_Financial in Model 3 is now significantly negative, which suggests that 
these are the buyers of last resort and that having pre-announced intention to 
sell assets can in fact hurt the bargaining position of the selling firms.  
Taken together, the results reported in Table 6 provide mixed support 
for our stated hypotheses. Specifically, because we find a negative coefficient 
of IndShok we reject the hypothesis that  pre-announcements serve to signal 
improvements of the remaining operations of the firm. In contrast, the 
negative coefficients of Ex-ante_BHAR, Profit and ConcurrentInfo_PreAnn and 
the positive coefficient of Leverage support the hypothesis that pre-
announcements are used to signal the turnaround of poor prior performance 
and financial distress. Finally, our results provide indications that non-pre-
announced asset sales involve the sale of assets in high demand, potentially 
initiated by foreign bidders 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Corporate asset sales are one of the most common ways productive assets are 
reallocated, making up approximately half of all M&A transactions 
(Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). Despite the operational and financial effects 
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of these transactions on the selling firms, little is known about the opaque 
selling process (Borisova et al, 2013). This study documents and investigates 
the effect of the pervasive use of voluntary disclosures through which selling 
firms inform potential buyers and capital markets that certain assets are 
available for sale. More specifically, we show that in 42% of completed asset 
sales the selling firm pre-announces its intention to divest, and find that these 
announcements elicit economically and statistically significant positive market 
reactions. Our analyses further indicate that pre-announcements are used to 
signal the turnaround of poor prior performance and financial distress. 
Furthermore, our results provide some indications that non-pre-announced 
asset sales involve the sale of assets that are strongly sought after, potentially 
initiated by foreign bidders. These seemingly different incentives for the two 
type of asset sales are also in line with our main finding that markets react 
more positively to pre-announced deals than to non-pre-announced deals. In 
particular, pre-announced deals imply that the future of the remaining 
operations will improve, which constitute the majority of operations of the 
selling firm. The returns to the non-pre-announced deals however seem to 
reflect a premium paid for the sold asset, which generally constitutes a 
minority part of the selling firm. Importantly, our results indicate that markets 
deem pre-announcements credible and that most of the valuation effects of 
the pre-announced asset sales are incorporated into the stock price of the 
selling firm prior to the deal-announcement. This, coupled with our results 
which suggest that the decision to pre-announce is related to the motivation 
for the asset sale, has implications for empirical tests of asset sales. 
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Figure 1 
This figure shows the distribution of asset sales delineated by deal type over years. The sample 
consists of asset sales by U.S. listed firms from 2005-2015, as further described in the sample 
selection section. 
 
 
 
  
42 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
This table summarizes deal (Panel A) and firm characteristics (Panel B) of the sample, which 
consists of asset sales by U.S. listed firms from 2005-2015, as further described in the sample 
selection section. PreAnn is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one in case the deal 
was pre-announced, and zero otherwise. Deal Value denotes the consideration paid (mil US 
dollars). Relative Size is the ratio of the deal value to the seller's market value of equity at the 
end of the previous fiscal year end. ConcurrentInfo-Deal (ConcurrentInfo-PreAnn) is an indicator 
variable that takes on the value of one in case the deal- (pre-) announcement was within one 
day of the reporting date of quarterly earnings announcements, and zero otherwise. 
ConcurrentInfo is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one in case either the deal- or 
the pre-announcement was within one day of the reporting date of quarterly earnings 
announcements, and zero otherwise. Time-to-Completion denotes the time in day between the 
pre-announcement and the deal-announcement. Related Asset is an indicator variable that takes 
on the value of one in case the two-digit SIC industry of the asset sold equals that of the seller, 
and zero otherwise. Intra-industry is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one in case 
the two-digit SIC industry of the asset sold equals that of the buyer, and zero otherwise. 
Foreign Buyer is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one in case the buyer is not a 
U.S. listed firm, and zero otherwise. Domestic-Inside is an indicator variable that takes on the 
value of one if the buyer is a U.S. listed firm and its 2-digit SIC industry of the asset sold 
equals, and zero otherwise. Domestic-Financial is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 
one if the buyer is a U.S. listed financial (i.e., SIC code 6000-6999) firm, and zero otherwise. 
Domestic-Outside is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the buyer is a U.S. 
listed non-financial firm with a different two-digit SIC industry than the asset sold, and zero 
otherwise. Foreign-Inside is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the buyer is a 
non-U.S. listed firm and its two-digit SIC industry of the asset sold equals, and zero otherwise. 
Foreign-Financial is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the buyer is a non-U.S. 
listed financial firm, and zero otherwise. Foreign -Outside is an indicator variable that takes on 
the value of one if the buyer is a U.S. listed non-financial firm with a different two-digit SIC 
industry than the asset sold, and zero otherwise. MVE denotes the seller’s market value of 
equity at the end of the previous fiscal year end. (ln)MVE indicates the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year end. Ex-ante_BHAR is the buy-
and-hold abnormal return to the selling firm in the year preceding either the pre-
announcement for pre-announced deals, or the 6 months lag of the deal-announcement for 
the non-announced deals, winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. Runup is the buy-and-hold 
abnormal return to the selling firm over the 2 days after the pre-announcement and 2 days 
prior the deals-announcement for pre-announced deals, or the 6 months prior and up to 2 
days before the deal-announcement for the non-announced deals, winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentiles. IndShock is an indicator variables that takes on the value of one in case any of the 
selling firm's remaining operation's industry receives a positive demand shock, and zero 
otherwise. A positive demand shock is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if 
the growth of the Tobin's q (((at - ceq)+(prcc_f*csho))/at) of an industry is in the highest 
quintile over the 1980-2016 period, and zero otherwise. Persistence is the estimated coefficient 
of a regression of firms' productivity on their one-year lagged productivity within each target's 
two-digit SIC industry over the 1998-2016 period. ExtFinDep is a measure of firm’s need for 
external financing, measured as the ranking of the two-digit SIC industry median need for 
external financing (i.e., [capx – oancf]/capx) of all firms in that industry over the 1994-2004 
period. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to book value of total asset ((dlc+dltt)/at). Litigious is 
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an indicator variable that takes on the value of one in case the selling firm belongs to 
industries prone to litigation risk, i.e. the computer hardware (SIC codes 3570–3577), 
computer software (SIC codes 7371–7379), or pharmaceuticals (SIC codes 2833–2836) 
industries, and zero otherwise (Johnson et al, 2001). Profit indicates the selling firm’s 
profitability (oibdp/at). 
  N Mean StDev p1 p25 p50 p75 p99 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics             
PreAnn 330 0.421 0.495 0 0 0 1 1 
Deal Value 330 745 1555 53 110 238 756 7000 
Relative Size 330 0.218 0.187 0.014 0.084 0.152 0.294 0.773 
ConcurrentInfo-Deal 330 0.158 0.365 0 0 0 0 1 
ConcurrentInfo-PreAnn 139 0.36 0.482 0 0 0 1 1 
ConcurrentInfo 330 0.288 0.453 0 0 0 1 1 
Time-to-Completion 139 178 138 9 85 139 233 634 
(ln)Time-to-Completion 139 4.88 0.839 2.197 4.443 4.934 5.451 6.452 
Related Asset 330 0.745 0.436 0 0 1 1 1 
Intra-industry 330 0.476 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
Foreign Buyer 330 0.273 0.446 0 0 0 1 1 
Domestic-Inside 330 0.336 0.473 0 0 0 1 1 
Domestic-Financial 330 0.224 0.418 0 0 0 0 1 
Domestic-Outside 330 0.167 0.373 0 0 0 0 1 
Foreign-Inside 330 0.139 0.347 0 0 0 0 1 
Foreign-Financial 330 0.045 0.209 0 0 0 0 1 
Foreign-Outside 330 0.088 0.284 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Panel B: Selling Firm Characteristics      
MVE 330 10969 37043 98 620 1727 4861 211132 
(ln)MVE 330 7.595 1.651 4.588 6.429 7.454 8.489 12.26 
Ex-ante_BHAR 330 -0.045 0.334 -0.82 -0.243 -0.081 0.107 1.09 
Runup 330 0.018 0.231 -0.692 -0.109 0.016 0.128 0.667 
IndShock 330 0.17 0.376 0 0 0 0 1 
Persistence 319 0.51 0.266 0.149 0.305 0.522 0.62 1.724 
ExtFinDep 330 29.782 15.706 3 16 28 47 49 
Leverage 330 0.313 0.205 0 0.183 0.287 0.424 0.941 
Litigious 330 0.203 0.403 0 0 0 0 1 
Profit 330 0.122 0.116 -0.261 0.081 0.125 0.169 0.37 
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Table 2: Deal and firm characteristics by deal type 
This table reports the (difference in) means of deal and firm characteristics of the sample 
delineated by deal type. The sample consists of asset sales by U.S. listed firms from 2005-2015, 
as further described in the sample selection section. The reader is referred to the caption of 
Table 1 for variable construction. Significance levels of the two sample mean comparison tests 
are denoted by ***, **, and * indicating p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.010 levels respectively. 
  Pre-
Announced  
  Non-Pre-
Announced  
  Difference 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics N Mean   N Mean   Mean p-
 Deal Value 139 1186 
 
191 424 
 
761*** 0.00
 Relative Size 139 0.233 
 
191 0.206 
 
0.027 0.19
 ConcurrentInfo-Deal 139 0.108 
 
191 0.194 
 
-
 
0.03
 ConcurrentInfo 139 0.417 
 
191 0.194 
 
0.224** 0.00
 Related Asset 139 0.799 
 
191 0.707 
 
0.091* 0.05
 Intra-industry 139 0.432 
 
191 0.508 
 
-0.076 0.17
 Foreign Buyer 139 0.295 
 
191 0.257 
 
0.038 0.44
 Domestic-Inside 139 0.302 
 
191 0.361 
 
-0.059 0.26
 Domestic-Financial 139 0.317 
 
191 0.157 
 
0.159**
 
0.00
 Domestic-Outside 139 0.086 
 
191 0.225 
 
-
 
0.00
 Foreign-Inside 139 0.129 
 
191 0.147 
 
-0.017 0.65
 Foreign-Financial 139 0.065 
 
191 0.031 
 
0.033 0.15
 Foreign-Outside 139 0.101 
 
191 0.079 
 
0.022 0.48
                 
Panel B: Selling Firm 
 
                
MVE 139 13037 
 
191 9465   3572 0.38
 (ln)MVE 139 8.014 
 
191 7.290   0.724**
 
0.00
 Ex-ante_BHAR 139 -0.089 
 
191 -0.014   -
 
0.04
 Runup 139 0.017 
 
191 0.018   -0.001 0.97
 IndShock 139 0.237 
 
191 0.120   0.117**
 
0.00
 Persistence 132 0.486 
 
187 0.527   -0.041 0.17
 ExtFinDep 139 33.849 
 
191 26.822   7.027**
 
0.00
 Leverage 139 0.323 
 
191 0.306   0.017 0.46
 Litigious 139 0.173 
 
191 0.225   -0.052 0.24
 Profit 139 0.134   191 0.113   0.021* 0.09
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Table 3: Predicting pre-announcements 
This table presents results of probit regressions for the probability of pre-announcing an asset 
sales. The dependent variable in all models is PreAnn, an indicator variable that takes on the 
value of one in case the deal was pre-announced, and zero otherwise. The sample consists of 
asset sales by U.S. listed firms from 2005-2015, as further described in the sample selection 
section. All models are estimated using the full. The reader is referred to the caption of Table 1 
for variable construction. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, 
p<0.05, and p<0.010 levels respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Persistence -0.004 
  
0.066 
 
(-0.01) 
  
(0.20) 
Ex-ante_BHAR 
 
-0.473 
 
-0.493 
  
(-2.04)** 
 
(-2.03)** 
IndShock 
  
0.564 0.547 
   
(2.77)*** (2.54)** 
(ln)MVE 0.278 0.278 0.243 0.249 
 
(4.76)*** (4.84)*** (4.18)*** (4.13)*** 
Relative Size 2.021 1.944 1.933 2.011 
 
(4.10)*** (4.01)*** (3.98)*** (4.08)*** 
ExtFinDep 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.019 
 
(2.96)*** (2.85)*** (3.44)*** (3.33)*** 
Leverage 0.421 0.249 0.311 0.400 
 
(1.07) (0.65) (0.80) (1.00) 
Litigious -0.114 -0.141 -0.081 -0.023 
 
(-0.57) (-0.72) (-0.41) (-0.11) 
Profit 0.611 0.733 0.813 1.048 
 
(0.83) (0.98) (1.08) (1.33) 
Constant -3.456 -2.853 -3.274 -3.045 
 
(-6.06)*** (-5.01)*** (-6.12)*** (-5.03)*** 
     Pseudo_R2 0.115 0.114 0.121 0.137 
N 319 330 330 319 
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Table 4: Wealth effects of asset sales 
This table reports and compares the cumulative abnormal returns to the events related to asset 
sales (i.e., pre- and deal-announcement). Additionally, this table reports and compares the buy-
and-hold abnormal returns to the selling firm over the 2 days after the pre-announcement and 
2 days prior the deals-announcement for pre-announced deals, or the 6 months prior and up 
to 2 days before the deal-announcement for the non-announced deals (Runup). The sample 
consists of asset sales by U.S. listed firms from 2005-2015, as further described in the sample 
selection section. The reader is referred to section 3 for variable construction. Significance 
levels of the two sample mean comparison tests are denoted by ***, **, and * indicating 
p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.010 levels respectively. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample Full Non-Pre-Announced 
Pre-
Announced  
Pre-
Announced 
Pre-
Announced 
N (n=330) (n=191) (n=139) (n=139) (n=139) 
Variable Deal_CAR Deal_CAR Deal_CAR PreAnn_CAR Total_CAR 
Mean 1.54% 2.02% 0.88% 2.41% 3.29% 
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.000 
      Panel B: Differences CAR 
 (2) - (3) (2) - (5)    Difference in 
Means 1.13% -1.27%    
(p-value) 0.083 0.112      
      Panel C: BAHR 
 (1) (2)      
Sample Non-Pre-Announced 
Pre-
Announced    
N (n=191) (n=139)    
Variable Runup Runup       
Mean 1.83% 1.74%      
(p-value) 0.148 0.172       
      Panel D: Differences BHAR 
 (2) - (1)     Difference in 
Means -0.10%     
(p-value) 0.485         
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Table 5: Multivariate analysis of stock market reactions to asset sales  
This table reports the OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns to asset sales. The 
sample consists of asset sales by U.S. listed firms from 2005-2015, as further described in the 
sample selection section. The dependent variable in models 1 and 2 is Deal_CAR and 
Total_CAR in models 3 and 4. The reader is referred to section 3 for variable construction. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.010 levels respectively.  
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  (1) (2) 
  Total_CAR Total_CAR 
   PreAnn 0.021 0.021 
 
(1.69)* (1.67)* 
Persistence 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.07) (0.03) 
Ex-ante_BHAR -0.064 -0.065 
 
(-3.86)*** (-3.88)*** 
IndShock -0.028 -0.025 
 
(-1.73)* (-1.55) 
(ln)MVE -0.005 -0.005 
 
(-1.15) (-1.14) 
Relative Size 0.063 0.067 
 
(1.78)* (1.88)* 
Litigious -0.004 -0.003 
 
(-0.32) (-0.21) 
ExtFinDep 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.18) (0.30) 
Leverage -0.033 -0.032 
 
(-1.18) (-1.13) 
Profit -0.068 -0.065 
 
(-1.36) (-1.30) 
ConcurrentInfo -0.026 -0.026 
 
(-2.14)** (-2.09)** 
Related Asset -0.009 -0.010 
 
(-0.70) (-0.75) 
Intra-industry -0.006 
 
 
(-0.53) 
 Foreign Buyer 0.007 
 
 
(0.58) 
 Domestic_Financial 
 
0.008 
  
(0.58) 
Domestic_Outside 
 
0.009 
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Chapter 3 
The effect of IFRS on ADR liquidity21 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in a firm’s domestic 
market on the liquidity of its American Depository Receipts (ADRs) traded on 
a U.S. exchange. Whereas prior research has examined the immediate effects 
of IFRS adoption on investor informedness, liquidity, and trading in domestic 
markets (Aharony et al. 2010; Jao et al. 2012; Byard et al. 2011; DeFond et al. 
2011; Hong 2013; Hong et al. 2014; Landsman et al. 2012; Tan et al. 2011; Yu 
and Wahid 2014), little is known about whether IFRS adoption has similar or 
distinctively different effects on cross-listing markets outside the IFRS 
environment. In this study, we explicitly compare the effect of IFRS on the 
liquidity of ADR securities with that on the liquidity of domestic securities. 
Examining whether and how these effects differ is important for the following 
reasons. First, IFRS adoption and, more generally, moves towards 
convergence of international accounting standards aim at improving the 
international flow of capital (Chen et al 2015; IOSCO 1998). Prior research 
                                                 
21 This chapter is based on Ghazizadeh, P., E. Peek, and D. Roesch. 2018. The effect of IFRS 
on ADR liquidity. Working paper. 
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shows that IFRS reporting indeed facilitates foreign direct investment 
(DeFond et al. 2011; Florou and Pope 2012; Yu and Wahid 2014). However, 
in addition to receiving foreign direct investments, firms access foreign capital 
by listing on foreign exchanges, either directly or through the use of 
depository receipts such as ADRs. Because firms trade off the costs and 
benefits of being traded on more than one exchange when deciding on such 
cross-listings, exchanges compete on benefits in the effort to attract listings 
(Pagano et al. 2002). Huddart et al. (1999) show that imposing strict disclosure 
requirements is one way to attract trading volume. Therefore, an important yet 
unanswered question is whether improvements in the accounting standards 
introduced by some exchanges affect the relative attractiveness of others and, 
in turn, cause trading to gravitate towards a few exchanges rather than catalyze 
global trading. Second, other factors than the quality of accounting standards, 
including the presence of knowledgeable investors and intermediaries, also 
play an important role in cross-listing decisions. The presence of these other 
factors causes firms to have heterogeneous cross-listing motives, which in turn 
determine whether information frictions between foreign and domestic 
investors matter for foreign investors’ willingness to trade. In the presence of 
such heterogeneity, changes in the domestic information environment may 
not affect all cross-listed stocks equally and could therefore cause a shift in the 
type of firms that cross-list on U.S. exchanges. 
We provide several reasons for why the adoption of IFRS in the 
domestic market could affect liquidity differences between the domestic and 
foreign trading venues. First, the adoption of IFRS in a cross-listed firm’s 
domestic market could affect the trading frictions or trading cost differences 
that motivated the firm’s initial choice to trade on multiple exchanges. More 
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specifically, IFRS adoption mitigates the risk of insider trading or market 
manipulation in a company’s domestic market (Brochet et al. 2013), which in 
turn would lower investors’ benefits of receiving better protection on a U.S. 
exchange. Furthermore, an important factor creating a trading cost advantage 
for U.S. exchanges and drawing trading activity away from domestic 
exchanges is the greater informativeness of order flows under a U.S. GAAP 
reporting system than under a local GAAP reporting system. We expect that 
this trading cost advantage decreases after the adoption of IFRS in a firm’s 
domestic market, when domestic order flows of peer stocks become more 
informative about cross-listed stocks’ value changes. In line with models 
predicting the concentration of trading in one exchange (Pagano, 1989), these 
effects could lead to a pull of trading activity towards the domestic market, 
improving (deteriorating) liquidity of the securities on the cross-listed firm’s 
domestic (U.S.) exchange. Alternatively, IFRS adoption could improve trading 
liquidity on the U.S. exchange by reducing the information processing costs to 
U.S. investors, amongst other reasons, because IFRS is arguably more similar 
to U.S. GAAP than most local GAAPs and the increased use of IFRS 
worldwide leads to greater accounting comparability across ADRs.  
To test the effect of IFRS adoption on ADR liquidity, relative to 
domestic liquidity, we collect a sample of 239 firms with level 2 or 3 ADRs 
from 31 countries of which 27 have adopted IFRS between 2003 and 2012. 
We find that, in line with a reduction in the information advantage of 
domestic investors over U.S. investors, IFRS adoption improves the liquidity 
of ADRs. We find no evidence that the adoption of IFRS is associated with a 
significant increase in liquidity in the domestic exchange, which refutes the 
idea that a shift in trading towards the domestic exchange ensues following 
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improvements in the domestic information environment. Our results further 
indicate that the improvement in the liquidity of ADRs depends on the quality 
of the domestic legal and regulatory institutions. Specifically, we find that 
mandatory IFRS adoption only affects the liquidity of ADRs of which the 
issuer’s primary securities trade in one of the developed markets, which are 
argued to have higher quality institutions (Christensen et al. 2013). We also 
find that post-IFRS improvements in ADR liquidity increase as a function of 
direct measures of legal and regulatory quality. Tests aimed at identifying the 
source of the improvements do not support the idea that the superior quality 
of IFRS relative to the pre-existing domestic GAAPs drive the liquidity 
improvements, but rather point towards the scale benefits that follow from 
reducing the number of standards according to which cross-listed firms 
report. In an additional analysis, we find that the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
affects the liquidity of level 1 ADRs in a similar way as that of level 2 or 3 
ADRs. We rule out that systematic differences in firm-specific characteristics 
between cross-listings from developed and emerging markets affect our 
results.  
Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. First, our 
findings add to the literature that investigates the consequences of mandatory 
IFRS adoption, primarily on domestic exchanges, by showing that 
improvements brought about by IFRS adoption can spillover to exchanges 
outside the IFRS environment. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the 
first to directly document that IFRS reporting improves liquidity of foreign 
securities traded on U.S. exchanges. As such, our results imply that IFRS 
adoption not only improves access to foreign capital through its positive 
effects on foreign direct investment (DeFond et al. 2011; Florou and Pope 
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2012; Yu and Wahid 2014) and access to other foreign markets within the 
IFRS environment (Chen et al. 2015), but also by improving access to a 
foreign market that has not adopted IFRS. 
Second, the finding that changes in domestic accounting standards 
affect the liquidity of securities traded on a foreign exchange also adds to the 
literature that examines cross-listings. While it is clear that the relative liquidity 
an exchange can offer is a crucial determinant of its competitiveness, we show 
that improvements in accounting standards do not necessarily improve an 
exchange’s liquidity advantage over competing exchanges. In fact, contrary to 
the predictions of gravitational pull models (Pagano, 1989), our results imply 
that the liquidity in foreign exchanges may improve (more) following domestic 
accounting improvements, which has important implications for ‘race for the 
top’ models (Huddart et al. 1999). 
Third and finally, our results are of importance to the literature that 
investigates the effect of informational frictions on investors’ capital allocation 
decisions. In particular, despite the diversification benefits that can arise from 
holding internationally balanced portfolios, prior research documents a 
preference of investors towards domestic securities (French and Poterba 1991; 
Ivkovic and Weisbenner 2005; Massa and Simonov 2006). Informational 
frictions, including a lack of familiarity with local GAAPs increasing 
information processing costs, are cited as factors that contribute to this so-
called home bias (Kang and Stulz 1997; Brennan and Cao 1997). While we do 
not measure investor holdings, and therefore do not directly measure 
imbalances in holdings, our results indicate that IFRS adoption reduces the 
information disadvantage of U.S. investors relative to domestic investors. As 
such, our results add to studies that document a positive association between 
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firms’ accounting choices and (U.S.) institutional investor ownership in (non-
U.S.) foreign firms (Bradshaw et al. 2004; Covrig et al. 2007; Khurana and 
Michas, 2011).    
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews prior literature and develops our hypotheses. In Section 3 we describe 
our sample selection procedure, variable construction, and research design. 
Section 4 presents our empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Background 
The past decade has seen an unparalleled move towards global 
standardization of accounting regulation, in particular for publicly listed 
companies. Following the introduction of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) in Australia and the European Union in 2005, more and 
more countries worldwide have started to mandate the use of IFRS for public 
reporting, possibly stimulated by the coincidentally increasing network 
benefits of IFRS (Ramanna and Sletten 2014).22 Prior literature broadly 
distinguishes two types of immediate benefits arising from such a move 
towards IFRS reporting.23 A first benefit is that standardization of accounting 
regulation helps to increase the comparability of financial reports across 
countries. For example, Yip and Young (2012) show that following the 
                                                 
22 Large economies that have adopted IFRS include Brazil, Canada, Korea, Mexico, and 
Russia. 
23 For a detailed review of academic research on the accounting and capital market effects of 
IFRS adoption see De George et al. (2016). 
59 
 
adoption of IFRS the mapping of economic events to accounting earnings has 
become more similar across peer firms from different European countries. 
Furthermore, using a similar approach towards measuring comparability Barth 
et al. (2012) find that non-US firms’ accounting systems have become more 
comparable to those of U.S. peers after switching from local GAAP to IFRS 
reporting. This finding is not unexpected as, despite being different, IFRS and 
U.S. GAAP have similar conceptual bases and have exhibited substantial 
convergence over time.  
A second benefit of IFRS reporting is that it improves corporate 
transparency. More than most local GAAPs around the world IFRS has as 
primary objective to ensure that financial statements provide decision-useful 
information to a firm’s capital suppliers. Consequently, from the perspective 
of (equity) investors a switch from local GAAP to IFRS must help to make 
financial statements more investor-focused and, in turn, improve the 
information environment of the firm. Consistent with this idea, prior research 
finds that after a change to IFRS firms report earnings that elicit a greater 
market response upon announcement (Landsman et al. 2012) and are more 
value relevant (Aharony et al. 2010). Also, IFRS adopters see their analysts 
become more accurate in forecasting earnings (Byard et al. 2011; Horton et al. 
2013; Tan et al. 2011). The evidence is, however, not unequivocal as some 
studies show that IFRS has not helped to improve earnings’ predictive value 
for future earnings or cash flows (Atwood et al. 2011) and has increased 
earnings smoothing and accrual aggressiveness while decreasing loss 
recognition timeliness (Ahmed et al. 2013). Further, some academics have 
expressed concerns about implementation and enforcement differences across 
countries (Ball 2006; Soderstrom and Sun 2007).  
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The documented effects of IFRS on accounting quality and 
comparability ultimately have capital market consequences. That is, theory 
predicts that increased transparency and comparability helps to reduce 
problems of adverse selection and estimation risk in capital markets and, 
consequently, improves market liquidity and lowers firms’ cost of capital (e.g., 
Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Lambert et al. 
2007). Confirming theoretical predictions, Daske et al. (2008) show that the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS led to an average increase in market liquidity in 
the European Union. IFRS adoption affects market liquidity especially if firms 
operate in an investor-oriented regulatory environment (Daske et al. 2008), 
have stronger incentives for transparent reporting, or have greater scrutiny 
from analysts (Daske et al. 2013). Likewise, prior research shows that both 
voluntary and mandatory adoption of IFRS has helped firms to reduce their 
cost of equity (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Li 2010). Further, the adoption of 
IFRS also promotes cross-border investing and listing activities. In accordance 
with the idea that IFRS increases comparability and hence reduces 
informational barriers between countries (Bae et al. 2008), research shows that 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS has increased cross-border investments 
(Beneish et al. 2015; Yu and Wahid 2014) as well as increased firms’ 
propensity to issue shares in foreign markets, especially in other IFRS 
adoption countries (Chen et al. 2015), while reducing underpricing and 
increasing the proceeds of such issues (Hong et al. 2014). 
In sum, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that the 
adoption of IFRS has increased accounting transparency and comparability, 
which in turn has improved investors’ willingness to trade and firms’ access to 
capital. There is also some evidence that the adoption of IFRS has improved 
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firms’ access to foreign equity markets by removing the burden of preparing a 
second set of financial statements under foreign GAAP and by reducing 
foreign investors’ information disadvantage over local investors. Research 
focusing on this effect has, however, not explicitly distinguished between 
equity cross-listings in the U.S. versus those in other countries.24 Below we will 
argue that unique characteristics of the U.S. regulatory environment cause the 
adoption of IFRS to have distinctively different effects on U.S. and other 
cross-listings. 
 
3.2.2 Main Hypothesis 
Theory predicts that without the existence of trading frictions or 
trading cost differences across exchanges and with domestic investors being 
informationally advantaged over foreign investors, concentrating all trading on 
a firm’s domestic exchange would achieve the greatest possible liquidity 
(Pagano 1989). Foreign exchanges can, however, attract trading activity by 
providing better investor protection against, for example, insider trading or 
market manipulation (Chowdhry and Nanda 1991). In fact, having embraced 
insider trading and market manipulation rules that are considered among the 
strictest in the world (Cumming et al. 2011), the U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, 
NASDAQ, and AMEX) attract comparatively much trading in stocks 
originating from countries with underdeveloped markets and weak investor 
protection (Halling et al. 2008). This distinctive characteristic of the U.S. 
exchanges potentially has consequences for the effect of countries’ adoption 
of IFRS on the benefits of U.S. cross-listings. That is, following Brochet et al. 
                                                 
24 Univariate statistics reported by Chen et al. (2015) suggest that the number of U.S. cross-
listings has not increased. 
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(2013), who find that transparency improvements following the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS has reduced insider trading profitability, we expect that the 
adoption of IFRS limits the accumulation of private information and, 
consequently, mitigates the risk of insider trading or market manipulation in a 
company’s domestic market. This, in turn, would lower investors’ benefits of 
receiving better protection on the U.S. exchanges and pull more trading 
activity towards the domestic market.  
An alternative mechanism through which the adoption of IFRS in a 
firm’s domestic market may affect the distribution of trading in the firm’s 
stock across domestic and foreign exchanges is the changed informativeness 
of domestic order flows. As shown by Baruch et al. (2007), order flows of 
peer stocks can inform market makers about potential changes in a stock’s 
value, thus helping to mitigate problems of adverse selection and stimulate 
trading (within a market). Basic logic predicts that the order flows of peer 
stocks are especially informative if trade orders are driven by timely and 
accurate information. Based on a broad range of research it is reasonable to 
assume that both U.S. GAAP and IFRS are superior, as compared to local sets 
of accounting standards, in providing such timely and accurate information 
publicly as well as in stimulating the production of private information (e.g., 
Byard et al. 2011). Under this assumption, an important factor creating a 
trading cost advantage for U.S. exchanges and drawing trading activity away 
from domestic exchanges is the greater informativeness of order flows under a 
U.S. GAAP reporting system than under a local GAAP reporting system. We 
expect that this trading cost advantage decreases after the adoption of IFRS in 
a firm’s domestic market, when domestic order flows of peer stocks become 
more informative about cross-listed stocks’ value changes.  
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While the above mechanisms imply that the adoption of IFRS would 
shift the distribution of trading in the firm’s stock towards the domestic 
exchange, IFRS adoption could also increase trading volume on the U.S. 
exchange. Specifically, prior literature shows that investor portfolios are 
disproportionately tilted towards the stocks of firms from their own countries 
(French and Poterba, 1991), and partially ascribe this to informational 
advantages of domestic over foreign investors (Halling et al., 2008). Relatedly, 
Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) and Massa and Simonov (2006) show that 
investors earn excess returns when they invest locally, which implies that the 
bias towards more approximate stocks reflects an informational advantage 
rather than a behavioral bias. As accounting information is a primary source of 
value-relevant information, the various accounting standards that cross-listed 
firms use to prepare their financial statements pose a cost to trading on the 
U.S. exchange. That is, a U.S. investor looking to diversity his portfolio 
internationally by investing in ADRs must incur a cost when learning an 
additional set of accounting standards, which in turn should render him more 
reluctant to invest. In line with this argument, Yu and Wahid (2014) show that 
differences in accounting standards affect investor demand by imposing 
greater information-processing costs on those less familiar with the reporting 
standards. Further, Lundholm et al (2014) show that firms cross-listed on U.S. 
exchanges in fact respond to a perceived reluctance on the part of U.S. 
investors and attempt to lower U.S. investors' information disadvantage by 
providing clearer and more concrete disclosures. The adoption of IFRS by 
cross-listed firms likely reduces U.S. investors’ information-processing costs 
because (a) the marginal costs of learning one broadly adopted set of 
accounting standards such as IFRS are much lower than those of learning 
various domestic GAAPs and (b) IFRS and U.S. GAAP exhibit strong 
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similarities. A potentially moderating factor is that, unlike when reporting 
under domestic GAAP, cross-listed firms that report under IFRS are not 
required to provide additional U.S. GAAP reconciliation disclosures. 
Nonetheless, on a net basis, we expect that the adoption of IFRS in a firm’s 
domestic market reduces U.S. investors’ information disadvantage, which in 
turn may increase trading activity on the U.S. exchange.  
In summary, as there are arguments for both a gravitational pull of 
trading activity to the domestic exchange and increased trading activity on the 
U.S. exchange, we do not take an a priori stance on the direction of the effects 
of IFRS adoption on a firm’s domestic and ADR liquidity and state our 
hypothesis in null form: 
Hypothesis: IFRS adoption in a firm’s domestic market is not associated 
with liquidity differences between the firm’s domestic securities 
and its U.S. ADR securities. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample Selection and Liquidity Measurement  
Our main sample consists of 239 level 2 or 3 ADR securities traded on 
one of the U.S. exchanges during the years 1998 and 2015, each matched with 
the primary listing of the issuer of the ADR’s underlying shares. In an 
additional analysis, we analyze 572 level 1 ADR securities and their matched 
primary listings. To construct a comprehensive sample of ADRs we combine 
data from various sources. Following prior studies, we obtain data from the 
August 2017 versions of the Bank of New York, Deutsche Bank, and JP 
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Morgan ADR websites. Because these websites primarily focus on currently 
listed ADRs and thus create a risk of survivorship bias, we combine these data 
with ADR data from CRSP, Eikon, Datastream, and the U.S. SEC’s 1996 – 
2015 lists of International Registered and Reporting Companies, which all 
include delisted ADRs. We distinguish level 1 from level 2 or 3 ADRs, for 
each sample year separately, based on whether the issuer of the ADR’s 
underlying shares (hereafter referred to as the issuer or the firm) is classified as 
an ‘International Registered and Reporting Company’ by the U.S. SEC.25 We 
identify each issuer’s primary listing using Datastream and require that the 
issuer has its primary listing in its country of domicile.  
Accounting data come from Worldscope and price and volume data, 
both for the ADRs and the issuers’ primary listings, come from Datastream. 
We establish the accounting standards used by each issuer, prior to the 
adoption of IFRS, using Worldscope’s classification, where we categorize U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS as “International GAAP” and all other accounting standards 
as “local GAAP”.26 Firms that report under International GAAP prior to their 
domestic market’s adoption of IFRS are considered voluntary adopters. We 
measure liquidity by firm-quarter using the following three measures: the 
natural logarithm of median trading volume (in U.S. dollar) during the quarter; 
the natural logarithm of the median of Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure 
during the quarter times minus one, and the proportion of zero-return trading 
days during the quarter times minus one. Whereas each of these variables has 
                                                 
25 We classify years in which ADRs change from level 1 to level 2/3 or vice versa as transition 
years and exclude these years from the analysis. Further, because the SEC’s list of 
International Registered and Reporting Companies does not contain data for 1999, we classify 
1999 as a transition year if ADRs change their registration from 1998 to 2000. 
26 To correct a small number of potential irregularities Worldscope’s accounting standards 
classification, we assume that issuers do not switch back from “International GAAP” to local 
“GAAP”. 
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been widely used in prior research, it is reasonable to assume that they 
measure liquidity with noise. In our empirical tests, we therefore us a factor 
score of the three variables, which we label liquidity factor, as our main 
measure of liquidity. The factor analysis yields one factor with an eigenvalue 
greater than 1.0, both in the domestic market (2.00) and the ADR market 
(1.82). 
Table 1 provides an overview of the sample composition by country. 
The sample consists of 12,143 firm-quarters from 239 unique firms from 31 
countries of which 27 have adopted IFRS between 2003 (Singapore) and 2012 
(Argentina and Taiwan). While the number of countries that adopted IFRS 
during our sample period far exceed those that have not, the distribution of 
observations before and after mandatory adoption is more balanced (8,003 
and 4,140 respectively). Approximately 10 percent (i.e., 802 out of 8,003) of 
the firm-quarter observations before mandatory adoption are observations 
from firms that voluntary adopted International GAAP (IFRS or U.S.GAAP). 
Table 1 further indicates that 13 domestic markets are part of the European 
Union and 18 domestic markets are located in a developed country. The last 
three columns of Table 1 provide information on institutional characteristics 
of issuers’ countries of domicile. Specifically, the columns report a measure of 
the magnitude of accounting differences between IFRS and pre-existing 
GAAP (Bae et al., 2008) as well as percentile-ranked measures of the strength 
of the judicial system (Rule of law) and regulatory environment (Regulatory 
quality), taken from the Worldbank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. Two 
institutional measures are significantly associated with the indicator variables 
for E.U. membership and market development. In particular, the 
(untabulated) correlation coefficients between the E.U. indicator and, 
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respectively, Rule of law and Regulatory quality are 0.55 and 0.50. Further, the 
correlation coefficients between the developed market indicator and, 
respectively, Rule of law and Regulatory quality are 0.80 and 0.76.   
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel A of Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of our liquidity 
measures, issuers’ market capitalization, and issuers’ domestic daily return 
volatility for the full sample. The means and medians of dollar trading volume 
indicate that most trading in sample firms’ securities occurs in the home 
market. In fact, the sample mean (median) of average daily volume during the 
quarter amounts to $115 million ($18 million) in issuers’ home market, 
compared to $20 million ($3 million) in the ADR market. Trading also 
generates a smaller price impact in the home market. The mean Amihud 
illiquidity measure is 0.155 in the home market versus 0.189 in the ADR 
market. Surprisingly, home markets appear less liquid, on average, when 
measured as the proportion of trading days in a quarter with zero returns. This 
finding confirms the notion that the three measures reflect different 
dimensions of liquidity and provides further support for using the measures’ 
factor score as a comprehensive measure of liquidity. The descriptive statistics 
also show that all variables are positively skewed, which motivates the use of 
log-transformed measures in the empirical tests. Panel B of Table 2 reports the 
correlations among the firm characteristics. The Pearson correlation 
coefficients indicate that the trading volume and liquidity on the U.S. and 
home exchanges are positively correlated. Furthermore, the Amihud and zero-
return-based measures of illiquidity are positively correlated with each other 
and negatively correlated with the trading volume measure. The correlations 
further indicate that larger firms are more liquid and have less volatile returns.  
68 
 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
3.3.2 Research Design 
Our empirical analysis focuses on assessing the effect of IFRS 
adoption on liquidity differences between primary securities traded on a 
domestic exchange and ADR securities traded on a U.S. exchange. To do so, 
we first measure the effects of IFRS adoption on the liquidity of securities 
traded on the domestic and U.S. exchanges separately and then determine the 
effect on liquidity differences by comparing the observed effects between the 
two exchanges. While many studies investigate the capital market 
consequences of IFRS adoption in domestic markets, their focus is not on 
cross-listed firms. In prior studies, cross-listed firms are either excluded from 
the sample (e.g., Christensen et al., 2013) or the reported tests cannot be used 
to clearly isolate the effect of IFRS adoption for these firms (e.g., Daske et al., 
2008; Li, 2010; Daske et al., 2013)27. However, as described in the previous 
section, the consequences of IFRS adoption on the liquidity of the individual 
securities of firms cross-listed in the U.S. are ex-ante not obvious. In particular, 
depending on which effect dominates, we could find an increase in ADRs’ 
relative liquidity because of a reduction in domestic investors’ information 
advantage or a decrease in ADRs’ relative liquidity as a result of domestic 
markets’ increased gravitational pull. Alternatively, if cross-listed firms 
                                                 
27 For instance, in testing the effect of IFRS on cost of equity capital, Li (2010) controls for 
the effect of firms being cross-listed and the results indicate that they have – on average – a 
lower cost of equity capital (Table 4, p. 621). However, our focus is on the change, rather than 
the difference in level across groups, of a dependent variable, which would have required the 
cross-listing variables to be interacted in the regression specification (Eq (1), p. 614). One 
exception is Daske et al (2008) who report untabulated results that suggest IFRS adopters that 
are cross-listed on U.S. exchanges experience lower, if any, liquidity improvements (p. 1120).  
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committed to high-quality disclosure and enforcement prior to the adoption 
of IFRS, we may not find a material incremental effect of adoption. 
In order to isolate the effects of IFRS adoption, we employ a 
difference-in-difference design in which cross-listed firms from countries that 
have not (yet) adopted IFRS serve as a control group for cross-listed firms 
from countries that have. We prefer this approach over comparing cross-listed 
firms to their home market peers because under our approach treatment firms 
and control firms share the partially unobservable motivation to cross-list28. 
We estimate the following model for domestic and ADR securities separately: 
Liquidity factorijt = β1(Post mandatory IFRSjt) + β2Voluntary adopteri +  
β3(Post mandatory IFRSjt x Voluntary adopteri) +  
∑βkControlsk + αi + γt + εijt              (1) 
where Liquidity factorijt is the liquidity factor score, as defined earlier, for 
security i, from country j, in year-quarter t; Post mandatory IFRSjt is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if country j has adopted IFRS by year-quarter t, and 
Voluntary adopteri is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i has adopted 
International GAAP before the mandatory adoption of IFRS by its country of 
domicile. Controlsj is a vector of two control variables: the natural logarithm of 
a firm’s market capitalization at the end of the quarter (ln[Market capitalization]) 
and the natural logarithm of one plus the volatility of a firm’s domestic daily 
returns during the quarter (ln[1 + Return volatility]). Further, αi are firm fixed 
effects, and γt are year-quarter fixed effects. The firm fixed effects control for 
                                                 
28 Note that our implicit assumption is that the unobservable motivation is homogeneous 
across cross-listed firms from different countries – which probably is not the case. However, 
we believe this poses a smaller problem than the alternative. We further address this issue in 
the tests reported in Table 6.  
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unobserved, time-invariant differences across firms, including any capital 
market differences across cross-listed firms from adopting and non-adopting 
countries prior to IFRS adoption, while year-quarter fixed effects control for 
capital market changes unrelated to the adoption of IFRS (e.g., general trends). 
The coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the incremental change in 
liquidity of the home market (ADR) securities of cross-listed mandatory 
adopters, relative to the change in liquidity of the home market (ADR) 
securities of cross-listed non-adopters. In all regressions, we cluster standard 
errors at the country and calendar quarter level. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Regression analysis 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis of the effect of 
IFRS adoption in a firm’s domestic market on domestic and ADR liquidity. 
Models 1 and 2 display the results of the main regression specification, where 
the dependent variable is the liquidity factor score and the sample consist of, 
respectively, ADR securities (Model 1) and domestic securities (Model 2). 
Column 3 reports differences between the coefficients of the ADR securities 
sample and those of the domestic securities sample.29 In line with the 
argument that IFRS reduces the information disadvantage of investors trading 
on the U.S. exchange, we find that the coefficient on Post mandatory IFRS x 
Mandatory adopter is significantly positive (0.140, p<0.05). Because an increase 
                                                 
29 Note that, because all explanatory variables in columns 1 and 2 are the same, the coefficient 
differences and t-statistics that we report in column 3 are equal to the coefficient estimates 
that we obtain if we regress ADR versus home market differences in the liquidity factor on all 
explanatory variables. 
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in ADR liquidity in the U.S. market does not automatically preclude a shift of 
trading towards the domestic market we focus our hypothesis test on the 
effect differences between the ADR market and the home market, reported in 
column 3. Model 2 shows that mandatory IFRS adoption is not associated 
with a significant increase in liquidity in the domestic exchange (0.054, 
p=0.26). Nevertheless, we find that the difference in liquidity across the two 
exchanges, as reported in column 3, is not significantly different from zero 
(0.086, p=0.21). This finding leads us to conclude that, on average, mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in the domestic market is not associated with a global shift 
of trading from the ADR exchange towards the domestic exchange or vice 
versa. For voluntary adopters we draw the same conclusion. That is, the 
directions and magnitudes of the coefficients capturing the effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on voluntary adopters’ ADR and home market 
liquidity are similar. Further, the coefficients are not statistically significant in 
either of the two models and they are not statistically different from each 
other (0.132, p=0.31).   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The finding that on a global scale mandatory IFRS adoption is not 
associated with changes in ADR versus domestic liquidity differences 
motivates us to refine the analysis. An important reason for doing so is that 
the effect of the IFRS mandate is arguably conditional on the prevailing 
regulatory quality of the country in which it is adopted (Christensen et al., 
2016). In particular, the effect of IFRS, which is deemed of higher quality than 
most sets of local accounting standards, could be larger in countries with 
lower-quality regulatory institutions before its implementation. Alternatively, it 
could be argued that the presence of high-quality regulatory institutions is a 
72 
 
necessary condition for the effects of IFRS adoption to materialize. Therefore, 
pooling all IFRS adoptions, without distinguishing among regulatory 
environments, could mask important cross-section differences. To address 
this issue, we separately examine the effect of IFRS adoption for cross-listed 
firms from European Union (E.U.) countries and firms from non-E.U. 
countries. By comparing E.U. with non-E.U. firms we build on prior research 
arguing that the legal and regulatory institutions in E.U. countries are of higher 
quality than those of other IFRS adopting countries (Christensen et al., 2013). 
In Models 4 and 5, we interact the explanatory variables of interest with two 
binary indicators: EU and non-EU. We further refine the non-EU group into 
non-EU developed and non-EU emerging, and report these results in Models 7 and 
8. 
A second potential concern is that other regulatory or enforcement 
changes enacted around the mandatory adoption of IFRS drive our results 
(Christensen et al., 2013, 2016). To alleviate this concern, we exploit the the 
fact that voluntary adoption of international GAAP by some of the firms in 
our sample is less likely to systematically coincide with country level regulatory 
and enforcement changes. More specifically, we include an additional indicator 
variable, labeled Post voluntary International GAAP, that reflects the timing of 
the voluntary switch to IFRS or USGAAP (i.e., takes on the value of one in 
and after the first quarter with international GAAP reporting) and interact this 
variable with the region indicator variables discussed above.  
The results of the additional tests indicate that the effect of IFRS on 
ADR versus domestic liquidity differences indeed depends on the quality of 
the prevailing legal and regulatory institutions. More specifically, we find that 
the positive effect of IFRS adoption in E.U. countries on the liquidity of 
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ADRs is both economically and statistically more significant than in the 
pooled sample (Model 4 vs Model 1), while the implementation of IFRS has 
no effect in the combined group of developed and emerging non-E.U. 
countries. As before, we find that the adoption of IFRS affects liquidity only 
in the U.S. market; its effect on domestic liquidity remains insignificant. The 
IFRS-induced increase in ADR liquidity for E.U. issuers is of such magnitude 
that the difference in the liquidity effect of IFRS between the two trading 
venues is statistically significant (0.261, p<0.10). The economic interpretation 
of this difference is that the mandatory adoption of IFRS reduces the liquidity 
gap between the ADR and domestic securities for E.U. firm by one-fourth of 
the standard deviation in Liquidity factor, which underlines the economic 
significance of the observed IFRS effect.  The results further dismiss concerns 
that other contemporaneously implemented regulatory or enforcement 
changes drive our findings. In particular, the coefficient on Post voluntary 
International GAAP x EU indicates that cross-listed firms from the E.U. that 
voluntarily adopted IFRS also experience an increase in ADR liquidity that is 
significantly greater than the concomitant change in domestic liquidity (0.240, 
p<0.10). In line with the notion that the scale benefits that accrue to U.S. 
investors from learning IFRS materialize when more firms report according to 
the new standards – that is, at the time of the mandatory implementation of 
IFRS – we find an additional increase in the ADR liquidity of voluntary 
adopters at the time of mandatory adoption (0.262, p<0.05). The incremental 
change in ADR versus domestic liquidity differences following the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS is positive but not significantly different from zero for 
voluntary adopters (0.266, p=0.22).  
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When we further split up the group of non-E.U. firms based on their 
domestic markets’ level of development in Models 7 and 8, the results we 
obtain by and large echo the above findings. In particular, we find that 
mandatory IFRS adoption has a similar effect on the ADR versus domestic 
liquidity gap for E.U. firms and non-E.U. firms from developed markets 
(0.272, p<0.10 and 0.337, p<0.10, respectively). Perhaps most strikingly, we 
find a significant decrease in the liquidity of the ADR securities of firms from 
emerging non-EU markets (-0.119, p<0.10). Considering that the coefficient 
on Post mandatory IFRS x Mandatory adopter x non-EU emerging in Model 8 is not 
significantly positive, which would have reflected a shift in trading, we 
interpret the decrease in ADR liquidity as confirming the argument of Shleifer 
(2005), Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) and Ball (2006), that in the absence of 
effective regulatory and legal institutions, new regulation could facilitate abuse. 
Overall, these results reinforce the conclusion that IFRS reporting reduces the 
information disadvantage of investors trading on a U.S. exchange, but only 
when the institutions that must safeguard its correct implementation are of 
sufficiently high quality. We fail to find evidence that is consistent with the 
idea that improvements in firms’ information environment result in a shift of 
trading to the more liquid domestic markets. 
 
3.4.2 Institutional Characteristics 
The results reported in Table 3 show that the effect of IFRS adoption 
on liquidity is restricted to ADR securities and conditional on an issuer’s 
country of domicile. In this section, we further explore potential sources of 
these findings. More specifically, the improved liquidity of ADR securities 
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could arise from two, not mutually exclusive, sources: (1) a reduction in the 
informational disadvantage of U.S. investors, even in the absence of any 
improvements in the quality of reporting, and (2) the higher quality of IFRS in 
comparison with domestic GAAPs. In an additional analysis, we interact the 
main explanatory variables of interest with the Bae et al. (2008) measure of the 
magnitude of accounting differences between IFRS and local GAAP. If the 
documented effects are associated with improvements brought about by IFRS, 
we expect that liquidity improves especially for firms from countries with a 
larger pre-existing distance to IFRS. Furthermore, whereas in the previous 
analysis we attributed regional differences in the effect of IFRS to differences 
in the quality of legal and regulatory institutions, we now complement this 
analysis by interacting the main explanatory variables of interest with two 
direct measures of institutional quality, Rule of law and Regulatory quality. 
We report the results of these additional tests in Table 4. For reasons 
of brevity we only report the differences between the coefficients of the ADR 
liquidity regression and those of the domestic liquidity regression. In column 1 
the coefficient difference of Post mandatory IFRS x Mandatory adopter x Rule of 
Law, which reflects whether the mandatory IFRS effect on (mandatory 
adopters’) ADR versus domestic liquidity differences varies with the strength 
of the domestic judicial system, has the expected sign but is not statistically 
significant (0.533, p=0.23). Similarly, the coefficient difference of Post 
mandatory IFRS x Mandatory adopter x Regulatory quality is positive but not 
statistically significant (0.538, p=0.25). We find similar results for the 
voluntary adopters at the time of mandatory adoption. However, this is less 
surprising given that the results reported in Table 3 suggest that the liquidity 
improvement for these firms mainly occurs at the time of their voluntary 
76 
 
switch to International GAAP. In line with this idea, we find that the 
coefficient difference of Post voluntary International GAAP x Regulatory quality is 
significantly positive (0.683, p<0.05). Focusing on ADR liquidity in 
untabulated regressions, we do find evidence that post-IFRS improvements in 
ADR liquidity positively depend on the strength of legal and regulatory 
institutions in an issuer’s home country. More specifically, both for Rule of Law 
and Regulatory quality, we find that the coefficients on Post mandatory IFRS x 
Mandatory adopter x Institutional characteristic are positively significant (0.699, 
p<0.01 and 0.748, p<0.05, respectively). We also find that, the effects of Rule 
of Law and Regulatory quality on the association between IFRS and voluntary 
adopters’ ADR liquidity are only significantly positive at the time of the 
voluntary switch. This suggests that voluntary switches by firms from 
countries with strong legal and regulatory institutions are considered more 
credible than those by firms from countries with weak institutions, which is ex-
ante not obvious (Daske et al., 2013).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In column 3 the coefficient difference of Post mandatory IFRS x 
Mandatory adopter x Institutional characteristic, which measures whether the effect 
of mandatory IFRS adoption on ADR versus domestic liquidity differences 
increases with the distance between local GAAP and IFRS, is not significantly 
different from zero. However, the coefficient difference of Post mandatory IFRS 
x Voluntary adopter x Institutional characteristic is significantly positive, implying 
that, as opposed to mandatory adopters, the effect of mandatory IFRS 
adoption on voluntary adopters’ liquidity gap increases in local GAAP’s 
distance from IFRS. With respect to the effects of the voluntary adoption of 
International GAAP, we find that distance to IFRS reduces the (positive) 
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effect of voluntary IFRS adoption on differences between ADR and domestic 
liquidity (-0.155, p<0.10). When we use ADR liquidity as the dependent 
variable, we find similar results (not tabulated), with the exception that the 
coefficient of Post voluntary International GAAP x Institutional characteristic is not 
significant. Overall, our results indicate that IFRS adoption has beneficial 
capital market consequences in the ADR market, but that these benefits 
depend on the quality of the firms’ domestic legal and regulatory institutions. 
Furthermore, our test do not confirm that these improvements arise from the 
higher quality of IFRS compared to local GAAP, rendering reductions in 
information processing costs as the most likely source. 
 
3.4.3 Firm Level Characteristics 
A potential concern is that the previously documented differences in 
the liquidity effects of IFRS between firms from developed countries and 
firms from emerging countries is not (only) driven by differences in domestic 
institutional quality but (also) by systematic differences in the type of firms 
that cross-list on U.S. exchanges. That is, while seeking a U.S. listing to reap 
bonding benefits that arise from a commitment to higher regulatory standards 
is more likely to be a primary motive for firms from emerging markets, prior 
literature documents several other motives that vary in importance across 
firms and industries30 and, importantly, could be differentially correlated with 
the consequences of IFRS implementation. Because the identification of our 
                                                 
30 Examples include raising capital, seeking expertise of knowledgeable analysts and investors, 
and product market benefits. We refer the reader to Pagano et al. (2002) for an overview 
(Table 1, p. 2654).  
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previous tests relies on variation at the region of origin level, these tests could 
suffer from measurement error problems.  
As a first step to address this issue, we investigate whether the firms in 
our sample indeed differ systematically across regions of origin. More 
specifically, we estimate a probit model to discern which factors distinguish 
cross-listings from developed countries from those from emerging countries. 
We include the following variables as regressors: issuers’ pre-IFRS average of 
the foreign sales to sales ratio, the pre-IFRS average of U.S. peers’ share in the 
issuers’ ICB Supersector (labeled Pre-IFRS average of U.S. industry importance), the 
pre-IFRS average of the explanatory value of U.S. market index returns for the 
issuers’ domestic stock returns (Pre-IFRS average of RSQUS), and a pre-IFRS 
high-tech industry indicator. We further include the pre-IFRS average of 
Liquidity factor in the issuer’s domestic market, the pre-IFRS average of daily 
return volatility in the issuer’s domestic market, and the pre-IFRS average of 
the natural log of the issuer’s market capitalization as control variables.  
The results of our probit regression, reported in Table 5 (Model 2), 
show that the probability that a cross-listed firm comes from a developed 
country is positively related to the proportion of its foreign sales to total sales 
and the importance of U.S. peers in its industry. This finding suggests that 
cross-listed firms from developed markets have an international focus and 
come from industries that are familiar to U.S. investors. The coefficient on the 
high-tech indicator is not significant, which refutes the idea that U.S. 
exchanges attract high-tech companies from European countries (Pagano et al. 
2002). We find that the co-movement of firms’ domestic stock returns with 
U.S. market returns is negatively related to the likelihood that a listing is from 
a developed market. This finding is in line with the idea that firms from 
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developed countries that cross-list on U.S. exchanges seek a broadening of 
their investor base by offering attractive diversification opportunities to 
foreign investors. We further find that firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges are 
more likely to be from developed markets when domestic securities are more 
liquid. We run the same regression using as the dependent variable an 
indicator for whether the issuer comes from an E.U. member state or a non-
E.U. country (Model 1). Because the results of Models 1 and 2 are very 
similar, and probability estimates of these models are highly correlated, we 
focus on Model 2 in the remainder of our analysis.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The probit regression results suggest that investor base optimization is 
more likely to motivate a U.S. cross-listing for firms from developed countries 
than for those from emerging markets, whereas the pursuit of a more liquid 
market is more likely to drive U.S. cross-listing for firms from emerging 
markets. To the extent that the implementation of IFRS is related to these 
differences, interpreting the results of Table 3 to reflect (solely) institutional 
characteristics would be erroneous31. For instance, it is possible that the 
comparability benefits arising from the implementation of IFRS have a larger 
impact on firms that operate more internationally. As in our sample these 
firms are more likely to be from developed countries, this, rather than superior 
legal and regulatory institutions, could (partially) account for the positive effect 
of IFRS on the liquidity of ADRs. Furthermore, explicitly accounting for these 
other motives should improve the estimation of the coefficients of our 
regressions.  
                                                 
31 Note that the test reported in Table 4 mitigate this concern.  
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Given the above, we rerun our main regression analyses after 
controlling for the estimated propensity of a firm being from a developed 
country and interactions of this propensity and the main explanatory variables 
of interest. This robustness analysis, which we report in Table 6, does not 
does not market change our main findings, i.e., those that relate to the effect 
of the mandatory adoption of IFRS. That is, we still find that mandatory IFRS 
adoption positively affects the liquidity of ADRs from developed countries, 
such that the difference in liquidity between the ADR market and the 
domestic market significantly increases (0.530, p<0.01 for E.U. markets and 
0.549, p<0.01 for non-E.U. developed markets). We no longer find a 
significant negative effect of IFRS adoption on the liquidity of ADRs from 
emerging markets. We do find that after controlling for the estimated 
propensities, the results for voluntary adopters change. That is, we no longer 
find any significant effects for these firms at the time of the adoption, while in 
all regions the liquidity in their domestic exchanges improve at the time of 
their voluntary adoption. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
3.4.4 Level 1 ADRs 
The previous analyses suggest that IFRS adoption has a comparatively 
stronger effect on the information environment of U.S. investors than on that 
of domestic investors, thus creating a comparatively larger liquidity 
improvement in the ADR market. If the observed improvement in ADR 
liquidity indeed results from a reduction in U.S. investors’ information 
processing costs, as we argued earlier, rather than, for example, an increase in 
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the effectiveness of U.S. enforcement, we would expect to observe a similar 
improvement in the liquidity of level 1 ADR securities. Issuers of level 1 ADR 
securities are exempt from most SEC reporting requirements and thus subject 
to a significantly weaker enforcement regime in the U.S. If our prior findings 
are primarily driven by a change in U.S. enforcement, we would expect that 
the effect of IFRS adoption on ADR liquidity is smaller for level 1 ADRs than 
for level 2 or 3 ADRs. 
To examine this issue, we re-run our main empirical tests using a 
sample of 572 level 1 ADR securities and their matched primary (domestic) 
listings. We refer to section 3 for a discussion of how we construct this 
sample. Column 1 of Table 7 displays the results of a replication of the 
analysis presented in column 9 of Table 3. When analyzing level 1 ADR 
liquidity, we find that the mandatory adoption of IFRS has a significantly 
greater influence on ADR liquidity than on domestic liquidity, both for issuers 
from E.U. countries (0.497, p<0.01) and for issuers from non-E.U. developed 
countries (0.312, p<0.05). Mandatory IFRS adoption also improves ADR 
liquidity more than domestic liquidity for E.U.-domiciled voluntary adopters 
of International GAAP (1.093, p<0.01). Furthermore, voluntary adoption of 
International GAAP improves ADR liquidity more than domestic liquidity for 
issuers from non-E.U. countries, both developed (0.199, p<0.05) and 
emerging (0.421, p<0.01). 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Replications of the three analyses reported in Table 4 show that Rule of 
law and Regulatory quality are positively associated with the extent to which 
mandatory IFRS adoption improves level 1 ADR liquidity (more than 
82 
 
domestic liquidity) (1.157, p<0.01 for Rule of law and 1.128, p<0.05 for 
regulatory quality). This finding is consistent with earlier findings in a sample of 
level 2 or 3 ADRs and confirms that mandatory IFRS adoption improves U.S. 
investors’ information environment especially if the domestic market’s legal 
and regulatory institutions are of high quality. We find that voluntary adoption 
of International GAAP improves ADR liquidity (more than domestic 
liquidity) especially if the judicial system in the voluntary adopter’s domestic 
market is weak (-1.005, p<0.05) or if the distance between the voluntary 
adopter’s local GAAP and IFRS is large (-0.241, p<0.01). This finding 
suggests that better information can help U.S. investors overcome their 
resistance to investing in level 1 ADR securities of issuers from countries with 
weak information or regulatory environments. All in all, the results of our 
analysis of level 1 ADR securities confirms that the information effects rather 
than the enforcement effects of IFRS adoption drive the observed 
improvement in (relative) ADR liquidity. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The implementation of IFRS by more than 120 countries constitutes 
one of the largest accounting regulation changes to date. While various effects 
of IFRS on the adopting markets have been examined, little is known about its 
effect on markets that have not adopted these standards. This chapter 
examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the domestic 
market of a U.S. cross-listed firm on the liquidity of its securities traded on the 
U.S. and domestic exchange. Using a sample of 239 firms with level 2 or 3 
ADRs from 31 countries, of which 27 have adopted IFRS between 2003 and 
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2012, we find that IFRS adoption improves the liquidity of ADRs more than 
that of domestic securities, which is in line with the notion that IFRS reduces 
the information disadvantage of investors trading on U.S. exchanges. Our 
results further indicate that the improvement in the liquidity of ADRs depends 
on the quality of the domestic legal and regulatory institutions. Tests aimed at 
identifying the source of the improvements do not confirm that the 
presumably superior quality of IFRS relative to the pre-existing local GAAPs 
affect the liquidity improvements, but rather point towards a reduction in U.S. 
investors’ information processing costs that results from the positive effect of 
IFRS adoption on accounting comparability. Collectively, our results imply 
that the adoption of IFRS in a U.S. cross-listed firm’s domestic market 
improves access to foreign markets that have not adopted the mandate and 
potentially U.S. investors’ capital allocation decisions, especially for those 
restricted to invest in securities on U.S. exchanges. Our findings further speak 
to the role of accounting standards in the competition between stock 
exchanges.  
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Table 4: Regression Analysis of the Influence of Institutional 
Characteristics on the Effect of IFRS Adoption on ADR and Home 
Market Liquidity 
 
ADR liquidity versus domestic liquidity 
Independent variable 
(1) 
IC = Rule of 
Law 
(percentile) 
(2) 
IC = 
Regulatory 
Quality 
(percentile) 
(3) 
IC = ln[1 + 
Distance 
from IFRS] 
    ln[Market capitalization] 0.115 0.112 0.112 
 
(3.59)*** (3.50)*** (3.48)*** 
ln[1 + Return volatility] 0.246 0.241 0.253 
 
(3.75)*** (3.58)*** (3.80)*** 
Voluntary adopter -0.539 -0.423 -0.513 
 
(-1.12) (-1.77)* (-1.16) 
Institutional characteristic -0.860 -0.914 0.000 
 
(-1.87)* (-1.72)* (0.00) 
Voluntary adopter x Institutional 
characteristic 0.766 0.550 0.223 
 
(1.15) (1.67) (1.15) 
Post mandatory IFRS x Mandatory 
adopter -0.271 -0.288 0.079 
 
(-0.96) (-0.90) (0.31) 
Post mandatory IFRS x Voluntary 
adopter -0.257 -0.350 -0.270 
 
(-1.12) (-0.72) (-1.63) 
Post voluntary International GAAP -0.233 -0.332 0.419 
 
(-0.91) (-1.58) (2.20)** 
Post mandatory IFRS x Mandatory 
adopter x Institutional characteristic 0.533 0.538 0.000 
 
(1.22) (1.17) (0.00) 
Post mandatory IFRS x Voluntary 
adopter x Institutional characteristic 0.565 0.581 0.206 
 
(1.31) (0.78) (2.36)** 
Post voluntary International GAAP 
x Institutional characteristic 0.454 0.683 -0.155 
 
(1.33) (2.45)** (-1.92)* 
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This table reports differences between the coefficients of OLS regressions of the 
influence of institutional characteristics on the effect of IFRS adoption on liquidity in 
two different samples: a sample of ADR securities and a sample of (matched) 
domestic securities. The sample consists of 12,143 firm-quarters of 239 issuers of 
level 2 or 3 ADR and domestic securities during the years 1998 and 2015. The 
dependent variable in all regressions is Liquidity factor (equal to the one factor with an 
eigenvalue greater than 1.0 extracted from three liquidity variables reported in Table 2 
– Volume, -1 times Amihud illiquidity, and -1 times Zero returns). All columns report 
differences between the coefficients of the ADR and domestic samples. Institutional 
characteristic is the percentile score of the rule of law index (taken from the 
Worldbank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators) in column (1), the percentile score 
of the regulatory quality index (Worldbank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators) in 
column (2), and the magnitude of accounting differences between IFRS and the 
country’s pre-existing GAAP (Bae et al., 2008) in column (3). The remaining variables 
are as defined in Table 3. All regressions include country, industry (Campbell 1996) 
and quarter-year fixed effects, with t-statistics (in parentheses) based on robust 
standard errors that are clustered by country and calendar quarter (Christensen et al. 
2013). The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, 
and p<0.10 levels respectively. 
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Table 5: Probit Regression Analysis of the Relationship between ADR 
Characteristics and Region of Origin 
Independent variable (1) EU vs. non-EU 
(2) Developed 
vs. emerging 
   Intercept 0.703 0.879 
 
(2.11)** (2.51)** 
Pre-IFRS avg. of ln(Market capitalization) 0.190 0.238 
 
(1.04) (1.59) 
Pre-IFRS avg.of ln(1 + Return volatility) 0.857 0.624 
 
(1.88)* (1.59) 
Pre-IFRS avg.of home market liquidity factor 1.280 0.917 
 
(3.61)*** (3.29)*** 
Pre-IFRS avg.of foreign sales-to-sales 3.171 2.052 
 
(5.73)*** (4.03)*** 
Pre-IFRS avg.of RSQUS -20.446 -21.023 
 
(-5.90)*** (-7.34)*** 
Pre-IFRS hightech indicator -0.309 -0.286 
 
(-1.11) (-1.05) 
Pre-IFRS avg.of U.S. industry importance 2.389 2.356 
 
(1.70)* (1.84)* 
 
  
N 239 239 
Pseudo-R2 47.7% 48.9% 
This table presents results of probit regressions testing the relationship between ADR 
issuer characteristics, prior to the adoption of IFRS, and region of origin. The sample 
consists of 12,143 firm-quarters of 239 issuers of level 2 or 3 ADR and domestic 
securities during the years 1998 and 2015. The dependent variable in model (1) is EU, 
an indicator variable equal to one for firms that are from a European Union country, 
and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in model (2) is Developed, an indicator 
variable that takes on the value of one for firms that are from a developed country, 
and zero otherwise. All independent variables are the pre-IFRS averages of quarterly 
values. Market capitalization is stock price times the number of shares outstanding (in 
USD million) during the quarter. Return volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns over a quarter. Liquidity factor equals the factor with an eigenvalue greater than 
1.0 extracted from three liquidity variables reported in Table 2 (i.e., Volume, -1 times 
Amihud illiquidity, and -1 times Zero returns). Foreign sales-to-sales is the ratio of sales 
95 
 
derived outside the firm’s domestic market to total sales. RSQUS is the adjusted R-
square of a regression of domestic daily stock returns on the daily returns of the 
value-weighted U.S. market index, estimated by firm-quarter. Hightech indicator is an 
indicator variable that takes on the value of one for firms in high-tech sectors (as 
defined by Pagano et al. 2002), and zero otherwise. U.S. industry importance is the 
fraction of an ICB supersector’s global market capitalization that comes from U.S. 
firms. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and 
p<0.10 levels respectively.  
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Chapter 4 
The Disciplinary Role of Accounting Conservatism: Evidence 
from State Antitakeover Laws32 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Accounting conservatism is defined as the asymmetric verification 
threshold for gains versus losses, where the threshold is higher for losses 
(Basu, 1997; Khan and Watts, 2009), and is one of the oldest and most 
influential principles in accounting (Sterling, 1970; Watts, 2003). While the 
benefits of conservatism in debt contracting have received widespread 
empirical support (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008; 
Zhang, 2008; Aier et al., 2014), its effect on investment decisions and 
especially its value to equity holders are far less clear33. As such, I analyze the 
effects of conservatism on managerial investment decisions, focussing on 
corporate acquisitions. More specifically, I exploit the staggered and 
                                                 
32 This chapter is based on Ghazizadeh, P. 2018. The disciplinary role of accounting 
conservatism: Evidence from state antitakeover laws. Working paper. 
33 More specifically, Francis and Martin (2010) and García Lara et al. (2016) provide evidence 
that conservatism is associated with improved investment efficiency, whereas Kravet (2014) 
shows that conservatism is associated with less risk taking. While Kravet (2014) is silent on the 
efficiency of the investment decisions, a large literature is concerned with the adverse effects 
of managerial risk aversion for equity holders (e.g., Coles et al., 2006).  
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unanticipated passage of state antitakeover laws (henceforth SAL) as an 
exogenous shock to managerial investment discretion (e.g., Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003; Gormley and Matsa, 2016). I further argue that the pre-
SAL level of conservatism of firms incorporated in a state is unrelated to the 
passage of SAL, as firms have built up their level of conservatism over years 
prior to these unexpected changes. As the passage of SAL does not differentially 
affect the investment opportunity set for firms conditional on their level of 
conservatism this setting allows me to circumvent endogeneity concerns and 
test whether accounting conservatism disciplines managers when there is a 
marked increase in their investment discretion.  
Extant theoretical work does not provide unambiguous predictions as to 
whether conservatism disciplines managers’ investment decisions and thereby 
affects equity values. On the one hand, conservatism is considered an efficient 
contracting mechanism (Watts, 2003), as the more timely recognition of losses 
expedites the signal investors receive regarding managers’ prior inefficient 
investment decisions, which reduces their willingness to make negative NPV 
investments (Ball, 2001; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). As such, conservatism 
can constrain managers’ opportunistic behavior (i.e., overinvestment), 
especially in settings prone to moral hazard problems. On the other hand, it is 
also argued that conservatism can have dysfunctional consequences by 
inducing underinvestment in positive, but risky, NPV projects 
(Roychowdhury, 2010; Kravet, 2014). More specifically, risky investments 
expose firms to larger potential losses than less risky investments with in 
expectation the same NPV. As large losses are disproportionately more costly 
than smaller losses (e.g., they are much more likely to trigger debt covenants), 
even risk neutral managers would rationally avoid the riskier investments when 
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under conservative accounting the large loss is recognized timely, but the 
reporting of a corresponding large gain from the risky investment is deferred 
(Kravet, 2014). Thus, for conservatism to truly act as a disciplinary 
mechanism, it should not only reduce overinvestment (i.e., negative NPV 
investments), but it should also not impede efficient risk taking (i.e., risky and 
positive NPV investments).  
To ascertain whether conservatism disciplines managerial behavior, I 
analyze corporate acquisitions in relation to the passage of state antitakeover 
laws, as this context provides several advantages. First, corporate acquisitions 
have been widely recognized as a prime event in which managers can pursue 
both overinvestment and inefficient risk reduction – which are exactly the 
manifestations of managerial discretion that conservatism may affect. For 
instance, Jensen (1986) describes managers’ incentives to engage in empire 
building via acquisitions at the expense of equity holders, while Amihud and 
Lev (1981) and Gormley and Matsa (2016) show that managers actively pursue 
the reduction of their firms’ riskiness via value-destroying acquisitions34. 
Second, corporate acquisitions are discrete investments with readily 
identifiable dates, which typically have a large impact on the firm’s value. This 
facilitates ‘clean’ empirical analysis (Roosenboom et al, 2014), especially in a 
difference-in-difference setting. Finally, prior work shows that the market for 
corporate control is one of the institutional arrangements that can discipline 
managers’ acquisition decisions (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Berger and Ofek, 
1996). State antitakeover laws however reduce the disciplinary threat of 
acquisitions by increasing the cost of hostile takeovers (e.g., Karpoff and 
                                                 
34 The findings of Gormley and Matsa (2016) are especially relevant to the present study, as 
they show that inefficient risk reduction occurs when managers are shielded from the market 
for corporate control as a results of SAL. 
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Malatesta, 1989), and thus provide an exogenous shock to managerial 
discretion. By focusing on the change in the acquisition activity of firms before 
and after the passage of SAL conditional upon pre-SAL levels of 
conservatism, I avoid most of the endogeneity concerns, which – as the 
authors acknowledge – make it difficult to infer a causal link between 
conservatism and investment efficiency in previous studies (i.e., Francis and 
Martin, 2010; Kravet, 2014; García Lara et al, 2016).  
In order to test whether conservatism reporting disciplines managers’ 
acquisition decisions, I exploit the staggered passage of SAL as an exogenous 
shock to managerial discretion.  I construct a measure for accounting 
conservatism similar to the c_score (Khan and Watts, 2009), and use its pre-
SAL level to classify the firm’s conservatism. I then examine the relation 
between conservatism and acquisition activity for publicly listed US firms 
incorporated in states that pass SAL with those incorporated elsewhere. More 
specifically, using a difference-in-difference setup, I test whether the ex-ante 
classification of firms by their level of conservatism explains the ex post change 
in acquisition activity, firm riskiness, and performance. These tests are similar 
to Balakrishnan et al (2016), who also use an ex-ante measure of conservatism 
based on conservatism levels prior to a shock (i.e., the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis), which is then interacted with an indicator variable designating 
post-shock observations, in a specification including firm fixed effects. Using 
state-year and industry-year fixed effects, I further control for unobserved, 
time-varying differences across industries as well as unobserved, state-level 
economic conditions that may coincide with the passage of SAL (Gormley and 
Matsa, 2016). Thus, in essence, I extend the findings of Gormley and Matsa 
(2016) by testing whether the sensitivity of acquisition activity to an exogenous 
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shock to managerial discretion is moderated by the firm’s level of conservative 
accounting. 
I start my investigation by testing whether stock market participants 
react differently to the news of the passage of SAL conditional on the ex-ante 
measure of conservatism of affected firms. More specifically, I conduct event 
studies on three dates when the first news reports related to the passage of 
SAL in Delaware – the state in which approximately 60% of the sample firms 
are incorporated – were disseminated. I then regress the abnormal returns on 
the ex-ante conservative measure, and find that equity holders react less 
negatively to an increase in managerial discretion for conservative firms. This 
result is in line with the hypothesis that equity holders anticipate that the 
increased managerial discretion will adversely affect the value of their stocks, 
and – more importantly for this study – that they expect conservative 
accounting to mitigate this. 
I then turn to the examination of the changes in corporate acquisitions 
by firms. I find strong evidence that the ex-ante level of conservatism is 
negatively related to the change in the acquisitions activity. That is, whereas 
firms that did not report conservatively prior to the adoption of the SAL 
increase their acquisition activity, there is no change in the behavior of 
conservatively reporting firms. The results also reveal that impact of SAL and 
conservatism on acquisition activity is highly economically significant: the 
estimated increase in acquisition activity  by 1.04% is almost half of the overall 
sample average of annual acquisitions, but it is fully offset by a two standard 
deviation increase (0.40) in the level of conservatism. As the adoption of SAL 
did not affect firm’s investment opportunities, these results indicate that the 
conservatism strongly affects acquisition activity.  
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 The main results are robust to alternative specifications and 
subsamples. For instance, I obtain similar results when I include different time 
fixed effects (i.e., state-year and industry year fixed effects or year fixed 
effects), or different sets of control variables. The results are also robust to the 
exclusion of firms incorporated in Delaware, or the restriction of the sample 
period to only the 11 years surrounding the adoption of the SAL. I also find 
that the observed relationship is stronger for firms incorporated in states 
where the strength of the SAL was high (Armstrong et al, 2012), providing 
further assurance regarding the causal effect of the conservatism on 
managerial discretion. The findings also survive tests designed to parse out any 
concerns regarding changes in acquisition activity due to anticipation of the 
SAL. Finally, the same results are obtained when the tests are run separately 
for each year in which SAL were adopted, which allows the inclusion of firms 
from states in which no SAL were ever adopted, rendering the results robust 
to different benchmark firms. 
A concern voiced in prior literature regarding the effects of 
conservatism is that they may be spuriously driven by management ability, 
when better managers would also report more conservatively. I address this 
issue by controlling for two different proxies for managerial ability; the effect 
of conservatism remains. More specifically, using pre-SAL industry adjusted 
profitability as a proxy for managerial ability, I find that both managerial ability 
and conservatism are negatively related to post SAL acquisition activity, 
indicating that even taking into account the lower proclivity of good managers 
to overinvest, conservatism still continues to exhibit a disciplinary effect. 
Using an alternative specification, we find that the mitigating effect of 
conservatism on acquisition activity is stronger for firms with lower ability. I 
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find very similar results when using the MA-Score (Demerjian et al, 2012) as a 
proxy for managerial ability. Thus, while I concur with Roychowdhury’s 
(2010) view that an interpretation of better managers embracing conservatism 
is valuable, my results seem to suggest that conservatism has an independent 
disciplinary effect on acquisition investments35. 
I next test the differential changes in firm performance and riskiness 
after the adoption of SAL conditional on firms’ pre-SAL level of conservative 
reporting, as the differential change in acquisition activity cannot 
unambiguously be interpreted as inefficient. More specifically, whereas an 
increase in acquisition activity would be inefficient if it is the results of the 
pursuit of managerial self-interest (i.e., empire-building or risk reduction), an 
increase would be efficient when the insulation from takeovers provided by state 
antitakeover laws allows managers to pursue more risky, yet (in the long run) 
more profitable acquisitions they previously would have forgone. As the 
proposed potential dysfunctional effects of conservatism on efficient risk 
taking would negatively affect an increase in acquisition activity of the latter kind 
(i.e., efficient), whereas the proposed disciplinary effects of conservatism 
would negatively affect an increase in acquisition activity of the former kind (i.e., 
inefficient), testing the effect of conservatism on firm performance and 
riskiness after increased acquisition activity allows me to measure the net effect 
of conservatism on investment efficiency. The results of my analyses strongly 
indicate that conservatism disciplines managers (more than it provides them 
disincentives to pursue risky projects); while firm performance and riskiness 
decreases after the adoption of SAL, the level of pre-SAL conservatism is 
                                                 
35 I still urge the reader to remain cautious in interpreting these results as conclusive, as 
managerial ability (and more generally governance quality) is notoriously hard to measure.  
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positively related to both, Together with the differential acquisition activity, this 
finding indicates that conservative reporting indeed curbs managerial 
overinvestment, while being highly inconsistent with the notion that 
conservatism prevents efficient risk taking. 
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, there is no consensus in 
the literature as to the impact of conservatism on investment efficiency. More 
specifically, concerns have been voiced regarding potentially adverse effects of 
conservatism on investment decisions (e.g., Penman and Zhang, 2002; 
Roychowdhury, 2010; Kravet, 2014). The results of this chapter however 
point in the opposite direction, as they strongly suggest that conservatism 
improves managerial (acquisition) investment decisions, and that equity holder 
value this. Furthermore, as argued by Roychowdhury (2010), the implications 
of conservative accounting for managerial decision making and firm value 
should be taken into account, when one considers the recent move towards 
fair-value based standards supported by influential bodies such as the FASB. 
Second, the evidence that suggests conservatism improves firm value is 
either based on debt market advantages, or wanting when it relates to equity 
holders. Speaking to value implications for equity holder, the literature has 
mostly focussed on managerial investment decisions (i.e., overinvestment and 
risk avoidance). However, the evidence provided by these studies (i.e., Francis 
and Martin, 2010; García Lara et al., 2016; Kravet, 2014) is insufficient to infer 
a causal effect of conservatism (Roychowdhury, 2010; Francis and Martin, 
2010; García Lara et al., 2016; Kravet, 2014). The setting used in this chapter 
allows me to avoid the endogeneity concerns of prior studies, and especially 
the event study results – to the best of my knowledge the first in evaluating 
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equity holders’ reaction conditional on the level of conservatism36 – probably 
provide the most salient and direct evidence that equity holders value 
conservatism. The contribution of the results of this study to this literature are 
perhaps best manifested as follows; while my findings lend support to those of 
Francis and Martin (2010) and García Lara et al (2016), they cast doubt on 
those of Kravet’s (2014) seminal37 work. The reader should however be made 
aware of the concurrent and the closely related study by Cedergren et al 
(2015), which arrives at exactly the opposite conclusion38.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section 
reviews the extant literature and develops the hypotheses. In section 3 the 
research design, the selection of the sample, and variable construction are 
discussed. Section 4 reports and discusses the results, and section 5 concludes. 
 
  
                                                 
36 Khan and Watts (2009) also conduct several event studies, but they investigate changes to 
conservatism in response to several events, rather than gauge the reaction of equity holders to 
those events.  
37 While Roychowdhury (2010) initiates the discussion of the potential dysfunctional effects of 
conservatism on managerial investment decisions, Kravet (2014) further develops this 
hypothesis and provides the first empirical evidence.  
38 Another concurrent and closely related study that merits further discussion is Balakrishnan 
et al (2016), which investigates the mitigating effect of conservatism on underinvestment due to 
the amelioration of financial market frictions (and not managerial risk incentives, as is part of 
the focus of this chapter). Put differently, whereas my results indicate that conservatism 
mitigates managerial misuse of investment discretion (i.e., overinvestment), their results suggest 
that conservatism facilitates external financing that allows managers to pursue value adding 
projects.   
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4.2 Background and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Managerial Discretion and Investment Efficiency 
Managers enjoy a large degree of discretion over the investment policy 
of their firms, as shareholders have delegated the decision-making authority to 
them (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The superior information managers 
possess further impedes the ability of shareholders to evaluate their actions, de 
facto further increasing managers’ discretion. Given the potential divergence of 
incentives, it has been widely recognized that managers are inclined to use 
corporate resources to pursue their own self-interests, (e.g., Berle and Means, 
1923; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Two manifestations of such moral hazard 
problems have been the focus of much of the prior literature: empire building 
(e.g., Baumol, 1959; Marris, 1964; Jensen, 1986) and inefficient risk reduction 
(e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990, Gormley and 
Matsa, 2016)39. The former refers to the managerial departure from an optimal 
level of investment by investing in negative NPV projects, where managers 
only bare part of the cost, while enjoying most of its (private) benefits. The 
inefficient risk reduction builds on the premise that managers’ wealth is not 
properly diversified, as the risk associated with managers’ income is closely 
related to the firm’s risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981). By diversifying the 
operations of their firms, they are able to reduce the risk to their human 
capital (Morck et al., 1990), even if this comes at the expense of shareholders. 
                                                 
39 Besides these moral hazard problems, inefficient investment could also arise due to adverse 
selection problems. For instance, firms could either overinvest when they have successfully sold 
overprices securities (e.g., Baker et al, 2003), or underinvest due to credit rationing when 
suppliers of capital recognize the firms’ incentive to sell overpriced securities (e.g., Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). Similar credit rationing arguments can ensue in ex post underinvestment due to 
ex-ante recognition of moral hazard problems (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
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Corporate acquisitions have been widely recognized as a prime vehicle 
through which managers can pursue both overinvestment and inefficient risk 
reduction40. By increasing the resources under their span of control through 
acquisitions, managers increase the non- pecuniary benefits (e.g., prestige) they 
enjoy (Stulz, 1990). Managers could further be motivated by pecuniary 
benefits (i.e., higher compensation) that arise from increases in firm size 
through acquisitions (Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt, 1991)41. Corporate 
acquisitions, especially of assets in (unrelated) businesses with imperfectly 
correlated cash flows, can also lead to reductions in the firm’s riskiness – i.e., 
the coinsurance effect (Lewellen, 1971). Amihud and Lev (1981) show that 
such unrelated acquisitions are prompted by manager’s desire to reduce their 
undiversifiable employment risk. In line with this, Gormley and Matsa (2011) 
show that managers react to increased liability risk by acquiring large, 
unrelated businesses with relatively high operating cash, especially when they 
have a higher personal exposure to their firms’ risk.  
 
                                                 
40 Note that corporate acquisitions, in addition to allowing managers to reap theses private 
benefits, are also characterized by (1) high degrees of information asymmetry, and (2) are 
notoriously hard to evaluate, even absent any information frictions (e.g., estimating the 
counterfactual). As such, corporate acquisitions are highly prone to moral hazard problems.   
 
41 Note that the positive relation Lambert et al. (1991) show between managerial 
compensation and firm size is stronger for levels than for changes (e.g., through acquisitions). 
Moreover, Lambert and Larcker (1987) show that changes to managerial compensation and 
wealth only increase after acquisitions which increase shareholder wealth. Avery, Chevalier 
and Schaefer (1998) show that while the compensation of managers does not increase after 
completing acquisitions, the likelihood of gaining outside directorships does increase, further 
attesting to the increase in prestige post acquisitions. 
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4.2.2 Market for Corporate Control and State Antitakeover Laws 
One possible disciplinary mechanism which deals with such managerial 
misconduct is the market for corporate control, where firms headed by 
inefficient managers are – through being acquired – replaced by those 
managers that apply their assets more efficiently (Manne, 1965; Marris, 1964; 
Jensen, 1986). Put differently, managers compete for the privilege to manage 
the firm’s resources (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Mitchell and Lehn (1990) 
provide empirical support for the disciplinary role of the market for corporate 
control and show that firms that make poor acquisitions, themselves become 
targets, and the bad acquisitions are undone subsequent to being bought. 
Similarly, Berger and Ofek (1996) show that firms with higher levels of 
diversification discount are more likely to be targeted and broken up.  
Given the evidence on the disciplinary role of takeover threats, any 
restriction to the takeover market arguably increases managers’ investment 
discretion. State antitakeover laws are such a restriction. A number of states 
passed a number of antitakeover laws in the mid- to late 1980s (the so-called 
‘second generation’) and late 1980s and early 1990s (so-called ‘third-
generation’) (Armstrong et al., 2012). These antitakeover laws effectively 
increase the cost of a takeover, and subsequently reduce the likelihood of a 
takeover42. Empirical evidence supports this notion; Comment and Schwert 
(1995) show that takeover premiums increased after the adoption of state 
antitakeover laws, and Schwert (2000) shows a decrease in the incidence of 
                                                 
42 E.g., business combination laws impose a moratorium on transactions – including mergers – 
between the acquirer and targeted firm for a period of three to five years, once the stake of 
the acquirer has reached a certain threshold (John, Li and Pang, 2017). Several studies provide 
more elaborate descriptions of state antitakeover laws (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; 
Armstrong et al., 2012; Gormley and Matsa, 2016). 
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takeovers. Prior studies further show that insulating managers from takeovers 
results in overinvestment and risk reduction43. For instance, Cheng, Nagar and 
Rajan (2004) find that managers significantly reduced their (risky) 
stockholdings, thus reducing their wealth exposure to firm performance, while 
retaining their prior level of control. Garvey and Hanka (1999) show that 
firms in states that adopted antitakeover laws reduced their leverage. Gormley 
and Matsa (2016) show that managers pursue value-destroying acquisitions to 
reduce their firms’ risk of distress when they are insulated from disciplinary 
takeovers.  
Despite the abovementioned evidence that suggests managers abuse the 
protection provided by alleviating the threat of hostile takeovers, it is 
nevertheless possible that state antitakeover laws have a positive effect on 
investment decisions of managers – without affecting the investment 
opportunity set. In particular, it is argued that when takeover threat is high, 
managers may be less inclined to tie their human capital to the firm which 
would otherwise foster the creation of innovative products (Shleifer and 
Summers, 1988). In line with this argument, Chemmanur and Tian (2018) 
show that protection against hostile takeovers spurs innovation44. 
 
4.2.3 Conservatism and Investment Efficiency  
As managers have different preferences in allocating the firm’s 
resources, it is crucial to the firm’s governance structures that the 
consequences (i.e., output) of managerial decisions are observable. One of the 
                                                 
43 Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) also provides evidence of other increases in agency 
costs, such as increased managerial compensation and reduced productivity. 
44 See Atanassov (2013) for evidence of the opposite. 
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key roles of accounting is to generate information regarding the firm’s 
operations, such that it is used to monitor managers. However, managers 
themselves are responsible for, or at least can affect, the preparation of 
financial reports. The rules governing the preparation of financial reports (i.e., 
GAAP) have therefor evolved to contain certain attributes to safeguard their 
usefulness, despite the managers’ proclivity to favorably skew reported 
performance (Kothari, Rammana and Skinner, 2010). Conservatism, a lower 
verifiability threshold for adverse information, is such an attribute. Kothari et 
al. (2010) vividly illustrate this; when the benefits that could arise from 
expenditures are sufficiently uncertain, these costs are expensed (in violation 
of the matching principle), as managers with limited tenures have an incentive 
to (indefinitely) postpone their recognition as expenses and provide a 
favorably biased picture of the firm’s performance. As conservatism impedes 
the ability of managers to misrepresent financial reports (i.e., improves the 
credibility and arguably the accuracy of information), the more timely 
recognition of losses also expedites the signal monitors receive regarding 
managers’ prior inefficient business decisions and facilitates timely 
intervention. In line with these arguments, Roychowdhury (2010, p. 180) 
states that the primary hypothesized purpose of conservatism is to facilitate 
accounting’s role in firm monitoring and governance by external parties. 
In addition to enhancing ex post monitoring leading to more efficient ex-
ante decision making, conservatism can also directly improve investment 
efficiency by increasing the sensitivity of managerial wealth to inefficient 
investment. Managers’ compensation and the firm’s debt covenants are often 
based on accounting earnings measures (Watts, 2003). Timely recognition of 
adverse outcomes reduces the earnings-based compensation of managers and 
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accelerates covenant violations, increasing the cost born by the manager by 
investing inefficiently (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Similarly, conservatism can 
also precipitate the discontinuation of loss-making projects45  (Francis and 
Martin, 2010). That is, as managers incur a cost when abandoning a loss-
making project in the absence of conservatism (e.g., through write-offs that 
reduce earnings), they have an incentive not to – especially given their limited 
tenure. As under conservatism the losses would be recognized early on, there 
is no additional cost for the manager to discontinue the loss-giving project. 
Taken together, conservatism can enhance investment efficiency directly by 
increasing the managerial cost of inefficient investment, and indirectly by 
facilitating more timely ex post monitoring. 
Prior studies provide evidence in support of the notion that 
conservatism enhances investment efficiency. More specifically, Francis and 
Martin (2010) find that more conservatively reporting firms make more 
profitable acquisitions and divest more timely. García Lara et al. (2016) 
provide further evidence by showing an association between conservative 
reporting and reduced overinvestment46. In addition, several studies 
investigate whether conservatism improves monitoring. For instance, Ahmed 
and Duellman (2007) find evidence consistent with accounting conservatism 
assisting directors in reducing agency costs, while LaFond and Watts (2008) 
                                                 
45 Note that while the quality of the project here is low, the ex-ante estimation of its 
profitability is not considered. That is, this could have been – in expectation – a positive NPV 
project, which did not turn out to be profitable.  
46 García Lara et al. (2016) also show that conservatism improves investment efficiency by 
limiting underinvestment that arises from debt-equity conflicts. Balakrishnan et al. (2016), 
studying the investment behavior of firms during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, report similar 
findings, further bolstering the potential of conservatism to curb underinvestment in the 
presence of information frictions.  
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indicate that there is a higher demand for conservatism in firms with high ex-
ante agency conflicts (i.e., high information asymmetry). 
4.2.4 Conservatism and Underinvestment in Risky Projects 
Alternatively, it is also argued that conservatism can have dysfunctional 
consequences by inducing underinvestment in positive, but risky, NPV 
projects (Roychowdhury, 2010; Kravet, 2014). More specifically, risky 
investments expose firms to larger potential losses than less risky investments 
with in expectation the same NPV. As large losses are disproportionately more 
costly than smaller losses (e.g., they are much more likely to trigger debt 
covenants), even risk neutral managers would rationally avoid the riskier 
investments when under conservatism accounting the large loss is recognized 
timely, but the reporting of a corresponding large gain from the risky 
investment is deferred (Kravet, 2014). In line with this hypothesis, Kravet 
(2014) finds that managers of more conservatively reporting firms make less 
risk acquisitions.  
 
4.2.5 Hypothesis Development 
Based on the above, I argue that the adoption of antitakeover laws in 
the state in which a manager’s firm is headquartered increases acquisition 
activity. More specifically, the insulation from takeover threats should both 
allow managers to pursue their own self-interest through acquisitions, as well 
as allow them to pursue more risky, yet (in the long run) more profitable 
acquisitions they previously would have forgone. The goal of this study 
however lies in uncovering the role of conservative reporting in managerial 
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investment decisions. The proposed disciplinary effect of conservatism is 
expected to mitigate the increase in acquisition activity when this arises from 
manager’s pursuit of self-interest in allocating the firm’s resources. The effect 
of the potential dysfunctional role of conservatism is less clear-cut: if 
conservatism deters managers from taking efficient risks, it could either mitigate 
efficient investments that are undertaken under the protection of state 
antitakeover laws, or exacerbate inefficient acquisitions aimed at reducing the 
riskiness of the firm. Overall, I expect the mitigating effects to weigh in more 
heavily, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The increase in acquisitions activity following the adoption of state 
antitakeover laws will be less pronounced for firms that reported more 
conservatively prior to the adoption of state antitakeover laws. 
As evidence in line with the above hypothesis would still be inadequate 
in allowing me to make inferences, I exploit the opposite implications of the 
two proposed effects of conservatism on investment efficiency. More 
specifically, whereas an increase in acquisition activity would be inefficient if it is 
the results of the pursuit of managerial self-interest (i.e., empire-building or risk 
reduction), an increase would be efficient when the insulation from takeovers 
provided by state antitakeover laws allows managers to pursue more risky, yet 
(in the long run) more profitable acquisitions they previously would have 
forgone. As the proposed potential dysfunctional effects of conservatism on 
efficient risk taking would negatively affect an increase in acquisition activity of 
the latter kind (i.e., efficient), whereas the proposed disciplinary effects of 
conservatism would negatively affect an increase in acquisition activity of the 
former kind (i.e., inefficient), testing the effect of conservatism on firm 
performance and riskiness after increased acquisition activity allows me to 
120 
 
measure the net effect of conservatism on investment efficiency. To be able to 
state my hypotheses directionally, I (randomly) assume that conservatism has a 
disciplinary effect on managerial investment decisions, leading to the following 
hypotheses: 
H2: The decrease in firm performance following the adoption of state 
antitakeover laws will be less pronounced for firm who reported more 
conservatively prior to the adoption of state antitakeover laws. 
H3: The decrease in firm riskiness following the adoption of state antitakeover 
laws will be less pronounced for firm who reported more conservatively prior to 
the adoption of state antitakeover laws. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Research Design 
The goal of this study is to analyze the disciplinary effect of accounting 
conservatism on managerial investment decisions. However, given the 
potential joint determination of conservatism in reporting and investment 
decisions47, and unobservable determinants of conservatism, a static analysis 
could yield biased results. In order to circumvent these issues, I exploit the 
staggered and unanticipated passage of state antitakeover laws. The adoption 
of these laws provides an exogenous shock to managerial discretion, which 
allows me to better isolate the effect of conservatism on investments arising 
from increased managerial discretion. That is, I argue that if conservatism 
                                                 
47 For instance, it is possible that the level of conservatism in the firm’s reporting is set in 
anticipation of future investment decisions.  
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affects investment decisions by mitigating managers’ abuse of their increased 
discretion, we should observe a less pronounced change in acquisition activity, 
the more conservatively they report. Furthermore, the unanticipated passage 
of these laws ensures that other factors’ effect on conservatism (e.g., 
anticipated investments) does not affect my results.  
More specifically, I argue that firms’ level of conservatism in the year 
preceding the adoption is unlikely to be related to the passage of state 
antitakeover laws, as these were adopted unexpectedly (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003; Armstrong et al, 2012), whereas firms build up their level 
of conservatism over the course of years48. Moreover, I argue that firm-level 
changes in acquisition activity can be ascribed to the increased managerial 
discretion – i.e., there is no change to firms’ investment opportunity set. It 
then follows that the passage of state antitakeover laws did not differentially 
affect the investment opportunity set for firms conditional on their level of 
conservatism. I also argue that firms’ pre-adoption level of conservatism is a 
good indicator for future conservatism, or more specifically, that firms that 
report relatively more conservatively prior to the adoption remain relatively 
more conservative after the passage of state antitakeover laws49. The latter is in 
line with the reported stickiness of conservatism by the extant literature (e.g., 
Khan and Watts, 2009; Kim et al., 2013). Taken together, the above allows me 
to effectively use firms’ pre-adoption level of conservatism as an instrument 
for their cross-sectional ranking after the passage of state antitakeover laws. 
The use of an ex-ante measure of conservatism, i.e. measuring conservatism 
prior to the shock and holding it constant after, then ensures that concerns 
                                                 
48 As Balakrishnan et al. (2016, p1) state; “accounting conservatism is a long-run equilibrium response to 
various institutional factors and firm characteristics”. 
49 This line of argumentation is adopted from Balakrishnan et al. (2016, p 20). 
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regarding anticipation of investment or any other factors affecting the level of 
conservatism, are alleviated. 
Using the above ex-ante measure of conservatism, I employ a difference-
in-difference design to test whether the sensitivity of acquisition activity to 
increased managerial discretion is mitigated by the level of conservative 
reporting. More specifically, similar to Gormley and Matsa (2016) I estimate: 
Yijlst = β1SALst + β2SALst*Conservatismi + αi + γlt + λjt + + εijlst           (1) 
where Y is the outcome of interest for firm i, in industry j, located in state l, 
incorporated in state s, in year t; SAL in an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
state s has passed a state antitakeover law by year t; αi are firm fixed effects; γlt 
are state-by-year fixed effects; and λjt are industry-by-year fixed effects. The 
firm fixed effects control for unobserved, time-invariant differences across 
firms; state-by-year fixed effects control for unobserved, time-varying 
difference across states (e.g., local business cycles); and industry-by-year fixed 
effects control for unobserved, time-varying difference across industries (e.g., 
differential trends across industries). As Gormley and Matsa (2016, p. 437) 
state, the inclusion of state-by-year and industry-by-year fixed effects ensure that the 
difference-in-difference estimates are robust to many types of unobservable omitted variables 
that might otherwise confound the analysis50. The coefficients of interest are β1 and 
especially β2: the former captures the differential response of two firms that 
operate in the same state, but where only one of these firms is incorporated in 
a state that passes an antitakeover law; the latter captures the moderating 
effect of conservatism on the differential response. Furthermore note that the 
                                                 
50 For the additional advantages of this estimation strategy, the interested reader is referred to 
the original article by Gormley and Matsa (2016, p.437). 
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pre-adoption level of conservatism itself is subsumed by the firm fixed effects. 
Finally, the standard errors are clustered at the state-of-incorporation level. 
4.3.2 Sample Selection and Variable Construction 
I restrict my sample to the period from 1980 to 1996, where the sample 
period begins (ends) 5 years before (after) the adoption of the first (last) state 
antitakeover laws. The data on the SAL are adopted from Armstrong et al 
(2012)51. Following Custodio (2014) I delete observations from the financial 
industry (SIC 6000-6999), agriculture (SIC lower than 1000), government 
services (SIC 9000), other noneconomic activities (SIC 8600 and 8800), and 
unclassified services (SIC 8900). I further require that firms have non-missing 
data on the variables used in the analysis (see below), and that firms have total 
assets of at least $10 million.   
In order to measure the conservativeness of the financial reporting of 
firms I construct a measure for accounting conservatism similar to the c_score 
(Khan and Watts, 2009), which has been widely adopted in the accounting 
literature (e.g., Kim et al, 2013; Balakrishnan et al, 2016). More specifically, it is 
estimated as the Basu (1997) cross-sectional regression  
Xi = β0 + β1Di + β2Ri + β3DiRi + εi    (2) 
where i indexes the firm, X is earnings, R is returns, D is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when R < 0 and equal to 0 otherwise, and ε is the residual. β2 and β3 
respectively measure the timeliness of good and the incremental timeliness of 
bad news (i.e., conservatism). To estimate the timeliness of both good and bad 
                                                 
51 Armstrong et al. (2012) obtain the year of enactment of state antitakeover laws from 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), but add the strength of said laws. 
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news at the firm-year level, Khan and Watts (2009) further specify that both β2 
and β3 are linear functions of Size, Market-to-Book and Leverage each year: 
 g-score = β2 = µ0 + µ1Sizei + µ2M/Bi + µ3Levi    (3) 
 c-score = β3 = λ0 + λ 1Sizei + λ 2M/Bi + λ 3Levi   (4) 
Note that the estimate of µi and λi (i = 0 – 3) are constant across firm, 
but vary over time. Substitution of equation (4) and equation (5) into equation 
(1) yields 
 Xi = β0 + β1Di +  
Ri (µ0 + µ1Sizei + µ2M/Bi + µ3Levi) +  
DiRi (λ0 + λ 1Sizei + λ 2M/Bi + λ 3Levi) + 
(δ0Sizei + δ1M/Bi + δ2Levi + δ3 Di Sizei + δ4 Di M/Bi +  
δ5 Di Levi) + εi      (5) 
Given my estimation strategy, I slightly adjust the above estimation, so 
as to make the estimates more comparable for firms across different 
industries, by allowing the empirical estimators of µ0 and λ0 to vary across 
industries:   
 g-score = β2 = µj + µ1Sizei + µ2M/Bi + µ3Levi    (6) 
 c-score = β3 = λj + λ 1Sizei + λ 2M/Bi + λ 3Levi   (7) 
where j indexes the industry. This leads to:  
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Xi = β0 + β1Di +  
Ri (µj + µ1Sizei + µ2M/Bi + µ3Levi) +  
DiRi (λj + λ 1Sizei + λ 2M/Bi + λ 3Levi) + 
(δ0Sizei + δ1M/Bi + δ2Levi + δ3 Di Sizei + δ4 Di M/Bi + δ5 Di 
Levi) + εi       (8) 
Finally, in line with the above stated building up a commitment to 
conservatism over several years, I estimated equation (8) using 5-year rolling 
windows instead of annually.  
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample. The mean 
(median) value of the accounting conservatism measure is 1.44 (1.45). Note 
that this measure is held constant for all firm-years at its before adoption 
value, which partially accounts for the low standard deviation (0.20) relative to 
the mean. The mean and median values of this measure remain fairly the same 
when estimated for each firm-year (not reported), which is in line with 
stickiness of firms’ accounting conservatism52. The mean value of Strength 
indicates that 77.5% of the observations are from firms incorporated in states 
that adopt strong state antitakeover laws as defined by Armstrong et al (2012). 
Note that this is mainly due to firms incorporated in Delaware, which 
                                                 
52 Not surprisingly, the standard deviation nearly doubles. 
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comprise almost 60% of the overall sample observations. Finally, Table 1 
indicates that average annual acquisitions make up 2.26% of the firms’ assets.  
 
4.4.2 Event Study 
I start my investigation by testing whether stock market participants 
react differently to the news of the passage of SAL conditional on the ex-ante 
measure of conservatism of affected firms. More specifically, I argue that if 
equity holders expect conservatism to discipline managers, they should react 
less negatively to the dissemination of the SAL news for firms that have 
adopted more conservative reporting prior to these unexpected events. In 
order to test this, I conduct event studies on the dates of the first news reports 
relating to the passage of SAL in Delaware. I focus on three dates to mitigate 
any concerns regarding anticipation. That is, while the news regarding the 
adoption of the antitakeover laws was made public on January 27th 1988, news 
regarding the Delaware Bar Association’s recommendation was made public 
on January 5th 1988 and December 22nd of 1987. As it is common in Delaware 
that recommendations of the Bar Association for a change in corporate law 
are swiftly enacted by the state legislature Herzel (1988)53, it is likely that equity 
holders already price in the effects of antitakeover laws prior to the actual 
passage date.  
Table 2 reports the results of the regressions of the 5-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (i.e., [-2, 2]) on the ex-ante measure of conservatism. For each 
of the three dates, the regression is run for both the full sample of Delaware 
                                                 
53 This was also the case with the state antitakeover laws: only 22 days after the Bar 
Association’s recommendation, Delaware’s House of Representatives passed the proposal by 
40 to 0 (Reuters, 1988).  
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firms, as well as a sample that is truncated at 5% (based on the CARs) in order 
to mitigate the effect of outliers. The results strongly indicate that stock 
markets react more positively to the news of SAL when firms report more 
conservatively. For instance, on January 5th 1988, the date eliciting the 
strongest reactions, cumulative abnormal returns were 1.6% higher for every 
one standard deviation increase in the firms’ conservative reporting. Note that 
the market reaction should be interpreted as the anticipated net effects of 
conservatism on investment efficiency: equity holders should price in the 
effects of both the potential disciplinary effects of conservatism, as well as any 
potential dysfunctional effects on efficient risk taking. As such, the market’s 
positive reaction is in line with stock markets attributing a positive role to 
conservatism in the efficiency of investment decisions. Note however that 
these results only speak to how equity holders revalue conservatism in 
situations where managers have increased discretion, i.e., are shielded from the 
market of corporate control. One should therefore be cautious in generalizing 
these finding to normal circumstances. 
  
4.4.3 Main Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the tests of Hypothesis 1. Column 1 
reports the estimates of Equation 1, which is the regression of acquisition 
activity of firms between 1980 and 1995 on the indicator for the adoption of 
state antitakeover legislation (SAL) and an interaction term between SAL and 
accounting conservatism measure (SAL x Conserv) in the year prior to the 
adoption of state antitakeover law. The positive and significant coefficient of 
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SAL indicates that the less conservatively reporting firms54 increase their 
acquisition activity after state antitakeover are adopted in their state of 
incorporation. Note that under the assumption that these laws did not affect 
firms’ investment opportunity set, this finding can be tentatively interpreted to 
be in line with managerial overinvestment – this issue will be revisited in 
section 4.4.5 Also note that the increase of 1.04% is almost half of the overall 
sample average of annual acquisitions, indicating the strong economic 
significance of state antitakeover laws55.  
Given the aim of this study, the main variable of interest is the 
interaction of SAL and the ex-ante conservatism measure Conserv. More 
specifically, whereas the coefficient of SAL captures the differential response 
of two firms that operate in the same state, but where only one of these firms 
is incorporated in a state that passes an antitakeover law, the coefficient of the 
interaction term captures the moderating effect of conservatism on the 
differential response. The negative and significant coefficient indicates that – 
in line with Hypothesis 1 – the acquisition activity of firms that reported more 
conservatively prior to the adoption is affected less by the passage of the state 
antitakeover laws. In fact, a two standard deviation increase (0.40) in the level 
of conservatism fully offsets the increased acquisition activity due to the 
adoption as estimated by the coefficient of SAL (1.05% versus 1.04%, 
respectively)56.  
                                                 
54 To facilitate interpretation, the minimum value of conservatism has been subtracted from 
each observation.  
55 This is even more surprising as state antitakeover laws – if anything – are aimed at 
preventing acquisitions undesired by target firms’ management. 
56 Another way to demonstrate the economic significance of conservatism on acquisition 
activity is to use the interquartile range: firms at the 3rd quartile of conservative reporting 
increased their acquisition activity 40% less than those at the 1st quartile. This should mitigate 
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In addition to the mitigating effect of conservatism on inefficient 
overinvestment, the negative coefficient of the interaction term can also be – 
tentatively – interpreted as mitigating the incentives of managers to 
(inefficiently) reduce risk. In particular, Gormley and Matsa (2016) report that 
after the adoption of state antitakeover laws, managers of affected firms take 
on inefficiently reduce their firm’s riskiness by way of acquisitions (of 
unrelated businesses and cash rich targets). Note that this interpretation stands 
in strong contrast to the potential dysfunctional effects of conservatism on 
efficient risk taking. Caution is however required when interpreting the 
coefficient of the interaction term with regards to risk taking for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is possible that even though more conservatively reporting firms on 
average increase their overall acquisition activity less than less conservatively 
reporting firms, they may disproportionally increase their risk reducing 
acquisitions. Secondly, the potential dysfunctional effect of conservatism on 
efficient risk taking is unobservable (i.e., forgoing risky but positive NPV 
investments), and therefore the test results reported in Table 3 are not a direct 
test of this hypothesis. 
Columns 2a and 2b report the estimates of alternative specification 
aimed at testing Hypothesis 1 that are more akin to specifications of prior 
work (e.g., Balakrishnan et al, 2016). More specifically, column 2a reports the 
results of a specification similar to Equation 1, but one that differs in the 
fixed-effects that are used (i.e., instead of state-year and industry-fixed effects 
only year fixed effects are used). The specification reported in column 2b 
further includes additional control variables (i.e., Q and Cash Flow). The results 
                                                                                                                           
concerns that the effect of conservatism is driven by outliers that affect the standard deviation 
of the conservatism measure. 
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materially remain the same, which holds that the findings are not sensitive to 
the specification used. Overall, in line with Hypothesis 1, the results of Table 3 
suggest that conservatism disciplines managerial behaviour when insulated 
from the threat of takeover.  
 
4.4.4 Robustness 
The results presented in Table 3 may suffer from several issues 
regarding the composition of the sample and identification. In this section the 
analyses aimed at addressing these concerns are reported and discussed. The 
first concern is that given that approximately 60% of the sample firms are 
incorporated in Delaware, the previously reported findings are mainly driven 
by this subsample. I address this concern by estimating Equation 1 for the 
sample that remains after dropping all the observations from firms 
incorporated in Delaware. As reported in column (1) of Table 4, the results are 
materially unaffected. A second concern with regard to the sample 
composition is the inclusion of observations that are too long after the 
adoption of the state antitakeover laws. To address this issue, I restrict the 
sample period to only the 11 years surrounding the adoption (i.e., the 5 years 
before and after). The results of this analysis are reported in column (2) of 
Table 4, and again remain highly similar to those of the full sample. 
I next turn to concerns regarding identification. Firstly, I conduct a test 
to validate the causal effect of state antitakeover laws by exploiting the 
variation in the strength of these laws across states. More specifically, if the 
state antitakeover laws indeed insulate managers from takeover threats and are 
therefore the reason for increased acquisition activity, we should observe more 
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pronounced effects for firm incorporated in states where the adopted laws 
were stronger than in states where the impact of the state antitakeover laws 
was limited. Towards this end, following Armstrong et al (2012), I divide the 
sample into observations from states with so-called weak and strong 
antitakeover laws. The results are reported in column (3a) and (3b) of Table 4. 
In line with the above stated expectations, the results strongly indicate both 
that state antitakeover laws increase managerial propensity to acquire, as well 
as that conservatism has a disciplinary effect on the increased managerial 
discretion in investment decisions. In particular, whereas in the subsample of 
firms subject to limited changes in the protection against takeover threats no 
discernable change in acquisition activity occurs (column 3a), a highly 
significant increase (both statistically and economically) emerges for firms in 
states where the adoption materially insulated managers (column 3b). 
Accordingly, the mitigating effect of conservatism is only significant in the 
subsample of firms with a material change in takeover protection. Note that 
the insignificant effect of the coefficient on the interaction term in column 
(3a) is especially informative regarding identification. That is, this regression is 
tantamount to a placebo test using random non-event years. In particular, a 
potential concern could be that conservatism always obstructs acquisitions, 
regardless of the underlying incentive (i.e., potential efficiency). Assuming that 
takeover threats positively affect acquisition efficiency, the insignificant 
coefficient of the interaction term dispels this concern.   
An identifying assumption is that state antitakeover laws unexpectedly 
increased managerial investment discretion, allowing me to use the pre-
adoption levels of conservatism as an exogenous source of variation. Prior 
studies that investigate direct effects of state antitakeover laws often consider 
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the possibility of reverse causality as a threat to the exogeneity condition, 
arguing the possibility that the passage of the laws may have been the result of 
lobbying efforts by firms that may have benefited from their adoption 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Armstrong et al, 2012). As these firms 
would anticipate the adoption of these laws, they could take actions that affect 
the outcome of interest. While several studies investigate this issue and dismiss 
the lobbying argument (e.g., Romano, 1987; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; 
Armstrong et al, 2012), I address this concern following the methodology 
advanced by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and used by several others 
towards this end (e.g., Armstrong et al, 2012; Valta, 2012). More specifically, I 
replace the SAL (and the interaction counterparts) with four indicator 
variables: SALm1 is an event time indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
is incorporated in a state one year before the adoption of state antitakeover 
laws and zero otherwise, SALt0 is an event time indicator variable that equals 
one if the firm is incorporated in a state during the year of adoption and zero 
otherwise, SALp1 is an event time indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
is incorporated in a state one year after the adoption of state antitakeover laws 
and zero otherwise, and SAL2plus is an event time indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state two or more years after the 
adoption of state antitakeover laws and zero otherwise. A positive and 
significant coefficient on SALm1 would be an indication of causality running 
in the opposite direction, as it would entail that increased acquisition activity 
precedes the adoption. As reported in column (4) of Table 4, the estimated 
coefficients of SALm1 and SALt0 are nevertheless insignificantly different 
from zero. Moreover, the coefficients of the first three event time variables 
gradually increase in both magnitude and significance, in line with the previous 
studies’ findings that the antitakeover laws were not anticipated and suggest 
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that the adoption preceded the increase in acquisition activity. Furthermore, 
consistent with the tests of the strength of antitakeover laws (column 3a), the 
insignificant coefficient on both the SALm1 and its associated interaction with 
Conserv can be interpreted as a placebo test: in years without the frictions 
imposed by state antitakeover laws, conservatism does not impede acquisition 
activity. Note that this argument needs not to hold after the adoption: as 
targeted firms can require higher premiums to accept a bid when insulated by 
antitakeover laws (Comment and Schwert, 1995), a significantly negative 
coefficient on the interaction term can no longer be interpreted 
unambiguously.  
Another concern is that measures of conservatism merely pick up the 
effect of other governance mechanisms such as the quality of the firm’s 
management team. For instance, Balakrishnan et al (2016) argue the possibility 
that better and more able managers are more likely to report more 
conservatively as they better understand the benefits of conservative reporting. 
As it is also probable that more skilled managers make better investment 
decisions, the previously reported mitigating effect of conservatism on 
acquisition activity could merely reflect the superior managerial ability. In line 
with this argument, García Lara et al (2009) show that firms with strong 
governance report more conservatively. In order to mitigate this concern, I 
follow Balakrishnan et al (2016) and re-run the previous test while directly 
controlling for managerial quality. More specifically, using two measures for 
managerial quality – i.e., the MA-Score by Demerjian et al (2012) and industry-
adjusted operating performance (Balakrishnan et al, 2016), both measured in 
the year prior to the adoption – I split my sample in firms with high (above 
median) and low (below median) managerial quality, and re-run the regression 
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based on Equation 1. As reported in Table 5, for both measures of managerial 
quality firms with low managerial quality show a much stronger increase in 
post-adoption acquisitions activity (i.e., the coefficient on SAL in columns 1a 
vs 1b and 2a vs 2b). Note that the coefficient of SAL in column 1b even 
becomes significantly negative, in line with the conjecture that good managers 
are less willing to acquire targets that can require high premiums in the post-
adoption period. More importantly, while the absolute magnitude and t-
statistics of the coefficient on SAL x Conserv are larger for the low managerial 
quality subsamples (column 1a and 2a), the mitigating effect of conservatism is 
still negative for the high managerial quality subsamples (1b and 2b) and 
significant when managerial quality is measure by industry-adjusted operating 
performance (and barely insignificant when managerial quality is measure by 
the MA-Score). I further use an alternative specification (unreported) in which 
the managerial quality proxies are included as interaction terms. The estimated 
coefficients of SAL x Conserv remain negative and significant, revealing that 
the mitigating effect of conservatism on acquisition activity is distinct from 
managerial quality.  
A limitation of the specification used in the previous analyses is that 
firms from states where no antitakeover laws were adopted cannot be used as a 
control group, as the staggered implementation of antitakeover laws renders it 
impossible to delineate the pre and post period. In order to circumvent this, I 
estimate Equation 1 separately for each year during which antitakeover laws 
were adopted as a final robustness test. More specifically, given that the pre 
and post period is now imposed by the year of adoption, I can compare the 
change in acquisition behaviour of firms from each cohort of state 
antitakeover laws with all the firms from states where such laws were not 
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passed. The results are reported in Table 6, and the estimated coefficients are 
in line with the previous findings. More specifically, all the estimated 
coefficients have the same sign as the results in Table 2, and are statistically 
different from zero for all but two year (i.e., 1988 and 1989), providing further 
evidence of the robustness of the main findings. 
 
4.4.5 Consequences 
The main focus of this study is to ascertain the effect of conservatism 
on the efficiency of investment decisions. While the results of the previous 
analyses strongly suggest that firms that report less conservatively exhibit an 
increase in acquisition activity after the adoption of state antitakeover laws, it 
does not necessarily follow that the increased acquisition activity is inefficient. 
Put differently, the change in the level of acquisition activity, does not speak 
unambiguously to its consequences for the acquirers’ performance and risk 
profile. For instance, it is possible that state antitakeover laws allow managers 
to pursue more risky, yet (in the long run) more profitable acquisitions, as 
these laws reduce the threat of forced turnover due to the absence of short 
term gains57. Especially given the proposed potential dysfunctional effects of 
conservatism on efficient risk taking (Roychowdhury, 2010; Kravet, 2014), it 
would be premature to label an increase in acquisition activity as inefficient. 
                                                 
57 Theoretical arguments regarding the effect of takeover protection on risk taking and 
innovation are mixed. On the one hand, it is argued that when takeover threat is high, 
managers may be less inclined to tie their human capital to the firm which would otherwise 
foster the creation of innovative products (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). On the other hand, it 
is argued that takeover threats mitigate moral hazard issues which if left unchecked would lead 
to less innovation (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The empirical evidence is equally mixed (see 
Chemmanur and Tian (2018) and Atanassov (2013) for empirical evidence in line with the 
respective theoretical arguments). Lel and Miller (2015) provide evidence that antitakeover 
laws increase the propensity to replace poorly performing CEOs.  
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This section therefore discusses the results of the tests aimed at uncovering 
the effect of conservatism on changes in firms’ performance (Hypothesis 2) 
and riskiness (Hypothesis 3) after the adoption of state antitakeover laws.  
Table 7 presents the estimation results of Equation 1, where the 
dependent variable is either a measure of firm performance aimed at capturing 
overall investment efficiency, or a measure of firm riskiness. More specifically, 
for the former I use industry-adjusted return on assets (measured both before 
and after depreciation deduction) and yearly stock returns, whereas the latter is 
measure as the yearly standard deviation of the stock returns. The results 
strongly suggest that conservatism has a disciplinary effect on managerial 
decisions. That is, the coefficient of SAL is significantly negative in all the 
regressions with performance measures as the dependent variable. More 
importantly with respect to Hypothesis 2, the coefficient of SAL x Conserv is 
significantly positive for the regressions of one of the profitability measures 
and the stock returns. Most salient are the results in column (4) of Table 7: 
while less conservatively reporting firms reduce their riskiness in line with 
managers’ abuse of investment discretion to reduce their firm’s risk (Gormley 
and Matsa, 2016), more conservatively reporting firms effectively take on more 
risk, a finding that is very hard to reconcile with the proposed potential 
dysfunctional effect of conservatism on efficient risk taking. Thus, overall the 
results presented in Table 7 indicate that conservatism prevents managers 
from pursuing their inefficient desire to reduce their firm’s risk, validating the 
more positive stock market reactions for conservatively reporting firms upon 
the news of state antitakeover laws adoptions.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
Extant empirical accounting research mostly focusses on the role of 
accounting in the supply of information for valuation and monitoring 
purposes, but (implicitly) regards the outcome of the underlying economic 
activity pursued by firms as independent of the accounting method used.  
More recent work endogenizes the role of accounting by recognizing that the 
quality of information provision by firms can improve investment efficiency 
by mitigating both underinvestment, through reduction of information 
asymmetry between firms and external supplier of capital, and overinvestment, 
by facilitating contracting and monitoring (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Biddle et 
al, 2009).  
This study extends this line of research by focusing on the role of one 
specific principle in accounting, i.e., conservatism, on investment efficiency. 
The reason for the focus on conservatism is twofold. Firstly, despite the 
central role of conservatism in accounting, there are both contrasting 
theoretical predictions and mixed empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
conservatism on investment efficiency. Secondly, the aforementioned 
literature ascribes the beneficial role of higher accounting quality mostly to its 
role in reducing information asymmetry between parties internal and external 
to the firm. The effect of conservatism on investment efficiency however 
stems from its asymmetric reporting of good and bad outcomes coupled with 
managerial incentives and factors that affect managerial investment discretion 
(e.g., covenants). In other words, while information asymmetry gives rise to the 
need for conservatism, the mechanism through which conservatism affects 
investment efficiency is distinct from its effect on information asymmetry.   
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Exploiting the staggered and unanticipated passage of state antitakeover 
laws in order to circumvent endogeneity concerns, I find evidence strongly in 
line with a disciplinary effect of conservatism on managerial investment 
discretion. More specifically, I find that investors react less negatively to an 
increase in managerial discretion for firms that report more conservatively. 
Using a difference-in-difference setup, I find that firms that report more 
conservatively do not increase their acquisition investments, while those 
reporting less conservatively do. Furthermore, while both the operating 
profitability, stock performance and riskiness of less conservatively reporting 
firms decline after increases in managerial discretion, more conservatively 
reporting firms’ performance is unaffected. Overall, the evidence of this 
chapter suggests that accounting conservatism mitigates inefficient investment 
that can be attributed to increased managerial discretion. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics. 
This table reports the summary statistics for the main sample, which refers to all firm-years 
between 1980 till 1995 for which the conservatism measure could be calculated.  Conservatism is 
based on the c-score measure of Khan and Watts (2009) and is calculated as discussed in section 
3.2. Note that it is estimated in the last fiscal year before the adoption of state antitakeover 
laws by the state of incorporation, and is subsequently held constant for all firm-years. Strength 
refers to whether the change in the SAL (state antitakeover law) was high, as defined by 
Armstrong et al. (2012). Acquisitions is the ratio of acquisitions to total assets. Cash Holdings is 
the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Cash Flow is the ratio of operating 
income before depreciation to lagged total assets. Leverage is the ratio of the sum of debt in 
current liability and long-term debt to the market value of equity. Profitability1 is the industry-
year (at 2 digit SIC level) adjusted ratio of operating income after depreciation to lagged total 
assets, and Profitability2 is constructed similarly but based on operating income before 
depreciation. Q is the market value of assets to book value of assets following Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997). Return Volatility is the yearly standard deviation of the stock returns for each 
fiscal year. Stock Returns are the yearly stock returns. 
 Mean St.Dev Q1 Median Q3 N 
Conservatism 1.444 0.20 1.367 1.454 1.523 24967 
Strength 0.775 0.42 1.000 1.000 1.000 24967 
Acquisitions 2.263 7.90 0.000 0.000 0.278 24967 
Cash Holdings 0.114 0.14 0.019 0.057 0.155 24964 
Cash Flow 0.153 0.13 0.090 0.147 0.214 24967 
Leverage 0.570 0.83 0.078 0.288 0.723 24967 
Profitability1 0.018 0.12 -0.035 0.013 0.072 24967 
Profitability2 0.021 0.13 -0.038 0.014 0.078 24967 
Q 1.488 0.92 0.980 1.203 1.657 24307 
Return Volatility 0.029 0.02 0.018 0.025 0.036 20006 
Stock Returns 0.162 0.45 -0.124 0.093 0.361 22158 
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Table 2: Event study. 
This table reports the estimates from regressions of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (i.e., [-
2; 2]) of three events related to the dissemination of news regarding the adoption of state 
antitakeover laws in Delaware on Conservatism (calculated as discussed in section 3.2).The 
samples consist either of all firms incorporated in Delaware at the time of the news (indicated 
by Full) or 90% of those firms as a results of a symmetric 5% truncation based on the 5-day 
cumulative abnormal returns (indicated by Truncated). t-statistics are presented in parentheses 
and standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
  22-Dec-87   05-Jan-88   27-Jan-88 
  Full Truncated   Full Truncated   Full Truncated 
Constant -0.114** -0.04  -0.446*** -0.285***  -0.145*** -0.061** 
 (-2.21) (-1.17)  (-7.64) (-7.03)  (-3.43) (-2.36) 
Conservatism 0.093*** 0.039  0.341*** 0.225***  0.097*** 0.036** 
 (2.64 (1.64)  (8.51) (8.06)  (-3.33) (2.01) 
         
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00  0.05 0.05  0.01 0.00 
N 1,495 1,352   1,495 1,349   1,495 1,352 
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Table 3: Acquisition activity and accounting conservatism before and 
after adoption of SAL. 
This table reports the estimates from firm-level panel regressions of acquisition activity 
(defined as the ratio of acquisitions to total assets) of firms between 1980 and 1995 on the 
indicator for the adoption of state antitakeover legislation (SAL) and an interaction term 
between SAL and accounting conservatism measure (SAL x Conserv) in the year prior to the 
adoption of SAL. SAL takes on the value of 1 in the years of and after the adoption of state 
antitakeover laws, and zero otherwise. For the construction of accounting conservatism, see 
caption of Table 1. Model (1) follows the methodology of Gormley and Matsa (2016), which 
includes firm, state-year and industry-year fixed effects. Model (2) includes firm and (fiscal) 
year fixed effects. Q and Cash Flow are defined as in Table 1. t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses and standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
  (1)   (2) 
   (a)  (b) 
SAL 1.040***   0.690**   0.806** 
 (2.85)  (2.56)  (2.43) 
SAL x Conserv -2.627***  -1.539***  -0.906* 
 (-5.61)  (-4.50)  (-1.97) 
Q     0.369*** 
     (8.25) 
Cash Flow     3.299*** 
     (4.79) 
      
Firm FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE No  Yes  Yes 
State-year FE Yes  No  No 
Industry-year FE Yes  No  No 
      Adj. R2 0.11  0.10  0.10 
N 24,967  24,967  20,719 
N Clusters 30   30   30 
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Table 4: Robustness. 
This table reports the estimates from firm-level panel regressions of acquisition activity 
(defined as the ratio of acquisitions to total assets) of firms between 1980 and 1995. In 
columns (1), (2), (3a) and (3b), acquisitions activity is regressed on the indicator for the 
adoption of state antitakeover legislation (SAL) and an interaction term between SAL and 
accounting conservatism measure (SAL x Conserv) in the year prior to the adoption of SAL 
(both defined as in table 3). The observations in these regressions however vary; (1) excludes 
observations of firms incorporated in Delaware, (2) only includes observations that are no 
more than 5 years away from the adoption of state antitakeover laws, (3a) and (3b) only 
include observations of firms from states that passed either weak or strong antitakeover laws 
respectively. Column (4) includes all firm-year observation, but acquisition activity is regressed 
on indicator variables that replace SAL (and the interaction counterparts) with four indicator 
variables: SALm1 is an event time indicator variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated 
in a state one year before the adoption of state antitakeover laws and zero otherwise, SALt0 is 
an event time indicator variable that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state during the 
year of adoption and zero otherwise, SALp1 and SAL2plus are an event time indicator 
variables that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state either one, or two or more years 
after the adoption of state antitakeover laws respectively, and zero otherwise. All models 
include firm, state-year and industry-year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the 
state of incorporation level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
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  w/o DE   (-5/5+)   SAL   Dynamic 
    
 Weak   Strong   
 (1)  (2)  (3a)  (3b)  (4) 
SAL 1.183*   0.961***   -0.021   1.781***     
 (1.85)  (2.92)  (-0.02)  (4.29)   
SAL x Conserv -2.473***  -2.802***  -1.87  -3.646***   
 (-3.77  (-4.38)  (-1.15)  (-4.85)   
SALm1    
 
    -0.416 
    
 
    (-0.52) 
SALt0    
 
    1.057 
    
 
    (1.66) 
SALp1    
 
    1.397* 
    
 
    (1.78) 
SAL2plus    
 
    0.724 
    
 
    (1.01) 
SALm1 x Conserv    
 
    0.300 
    
 
    (0.28) 
SALt0 x Conserv    
 
    -3.219*** 
    
 
    (-4.70) 
SALp1 x Conserv    
 
    -2.974*** 
    
 
    (-2.91) 
SAL2plus x 
Conserv 
 
  
 
    -2.418*** 
 
 
       (-3.79) 
  
        
Adj. R2 0.07  0.11  0.08  0.12  0.11 
N 10,798  18,618  5,358  19,309  24,967 
N Clusters 29   30   16   14   30 
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Table 5: Managerial quality. 
This table reports the estimates from firm-level panel regressions of acquisition activity 
(defined as the ratio of acquisitions to total assets) of firms between 1980 and 1995 on the 
indicator for the adoption of state antitakeover legislation (SAL) and an interaction term 
between SAL and accounting conservatism measure (SAL x Conserv) in the year prior to the 
adoption of SAL. SAL takes on the value of 1 in the years of and after the adoption of state 
antitakeover laws, and zero otherwise. For the construction of accounting conservatism, see 
caption of Table 1. The observations in these regressions however vary; column (1a) and (1b) 
include observations that had respectively below or above median values of the MA-Score (see 
Demerjian et al (2012) for construction) in the year before the adoption of antitakeover laws in 
their state of incorporation. Column (2a) and (2b) include observations that had respectively 
below or above median values of 2-digit SIC industry-adjusted profitability (ratio of operating 
income after depreciation to lagged total assets) in the year before the adoption of antitakeover 
laws in their state of incorporation. All models include firm, state-year and industry-year fixed 
effects and standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for 
two-tailed tests, respectively.  
 
Low  
MA-Score 
High 
MA-Score 
 
Low  
IA. Profit 
High  
IA. Profit 
 (1a) (1b)  (2a) (2b) 
SAL 3.044*** -0.894* 
 
1.549*** 0.541 
 
(5.97) (-1.80) 
 
(2.83) (1.47) 
SAL x Conserv -4.326*** -1.154 
 
-3.093*** -2.038** 
 
(-8.47) (-1.70) 
 
(-4.38) (-2.63) 
      Adj. R2 0.12 0.10 
 
0.11 0.12 
N 11,465 11,433 
 
11,173 13,450 
N Clusters 27 29   27 28 
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Table 6: Year of adoption. 
This table reports the estimates from firm-level panel regressions of acquisition activity 
(defined as the ratio of acquisitions to total assets) of firms between 1980 and 1995. Note that 
– different that the other tables – the sample not only includes firms from states that adopted 
antitakeover laws, but also from states that never did. Each column contains observations 
from states that adopted state antitakeover laws in the year as indicated by the column title, 
and firms from states that never adopted antitakeover laws. Acquisition activity is regressed on 
the indicator for the adoption of state antitakeover legislation (SAL) and an interaction term 
between SAL and accounting conservatism measure (SAL x Conserv) in the year prior to the 
adoption of SAL. Note that SAL takes on the value of 1 in the years of and after the year 
indicated in the column title, and zero otherwise. For the construction of accounting 
conservatism, see caption of Table 1. All models only include firm fixed effects and standard 
errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for two-tailed tests, 
respectively.  
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
SAL 2.220*** 2.919*** 1.662* 0.582 0.01 1.479** 0.64 
 (4.80) (6.64) (1.87) (0.98) (0.02) (2.54) (1.44) 
SAL x Conserv -5.134*** 7.494*** 4.162** -2.627 -0.438 -9.256*** -5.849*** 
 (-3.51) (-4.65) (-2.04) (-1.48) (-0.15) (-3.49) (-4.09) 
        
Adj. R2 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
N 16,894 16,398 15,836 22,457 7,951 4,897 3,873 
N Clusters 47 46 45 39 31 24 21 
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Table 7: Consequences. 
This table reports the estimates from firm-level panel regressions of operating profitability, 
stock performance or riskiness measures of firms between 1980 and 1995 on the indicator for 
the adoption of state antitakeover legislation (SAL) and an interaction term between SAL and 
accounting conservatism measure (SAL x Conserv) in the year prior to the adoption of SAL. 
SAL takes on the value of 1 in the years of and after the adoption of state antitakeover laws, 
and zero otherwise. For the construction of accounting conservatism, see caption of Table 1. 
The specific dependent variables are indicated as column titles and are constructed as 
described in the caption of Table 1. All models include firm, state-year and industry-year fixed 
effects and standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation level. t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for 
two-tailed tests, respectively.  
  Profitability   Profitability2   Stock Returns   
Return 
Volatility 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
SAL -0.012**  -0.016***  -0.076***  -0.003** 
 (-2.43)  (-3.42)  (-2.77)  (-2.63) 
SAL x Conserv 0.008  0.016*  0.152**  0.006*** 
 (0.98)  (1.81)  (2.70)  (3.61) 
      
  
Adj. R2 0.45  0.47  0.17  0.66 
N 24,678  24,673  21,816  19,966 
N Clusters 30   30   30   30 
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English summary (Summary in Dutch)  
A primary function of capital markets is to efficiently allocate capital, 
which entails the flow of capital to investments with the highest returns 
commensurate with their risk (Tobin, 1984). The market of corporate assets 
fulfills a similar function, where ideally productive assets are transferred to 
those most equipped to manage them (Manne, 1965). A large body of 
scientific inquiry identifies informational frictions as impediments to the 
efficient functioning of these markets. To mitigate these adverse effects, firms 
provide financial information to parties external to the firm. For the most 
part, this information is generated by the firms’ accounting function and its 
presentation and disclosure are guided by accounting standards. The studies 
comprising this dissertation empirically investigate several aspects of the role 
financial accounting information plays in asset and capital markets.  
Chapter 2 investigates the voluntary provision of information in the 
market of corporate assets sales and finds evidence which suggests that these 
disclosures are used to signal the turnaround of poor prior performance and 
financial distress. Chapter 3 investigates the effect of changes in accounting 
standards (i.e., IFRS) on the asymmetric distribution of information amongst 
capital market participants. The results indicate that IFRS adoption in cross-
listed firm’s domestic market improves the liquidity of ADRs, in line with the 
reduction of the information disadvantage of investors trading on U.S. 
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exchanges. Finally, chapter 4 finds that a commitment to providing 
conservative accounting information disciplines the allocation of capital by 
managers when state legislation increases managerial discretion. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)  
(Summary in Dutch)  
Een primaire functie van kapitaalmarkten is het efficiënt alloceren van 
kapitaal, hetgeen inhoudt dat kapitaal naar investeringen stroomt met het 
hoogste rendement gegeven de bijbehorende risico (Tobin, 1984). De markt 
voor activa vervult een vergelijkbare functie, waarbij idealiter productieve 
activa worden overgedragen aan diegenen die het best zijn toegerust om ze te 
beheren (Manne, 1965). Echter, zoals in andere aspecten van het leven, 
beletten fricties het optimaal functioneren van markten, waardoor de 
voordelen voor de samenleving niet altijd ten volle benut worden. Een groot 
aantal wetenschappelijke studies heeft zich gewijd aan het identificeren en 
analyseren van deze fricties, en stelt vast dat de asymmetrische verdeling van 
informatie tussen verschillende partijen, gekoppeld aan hun uiteenlopende 
belangen, leidt tot verhoogde financieringskosten (Jensen en Meckling, 1976), 
kredietbeperking (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), of zelfs een complete 
ineenstorting van markten (Akerlof, 1970). Om deze nadelige effecten te 
reduceren, verstrekken bedrijven financiële informatie aan externe partijen. 
Deze informatie wordt grotendeels gegenereerd door het accountingsysteem 
van de bedrijven en de rapportering ervan wordt geleid door 
verslaggevingsstandaarden. De studies die dit proefschrift omvat, onderzoeken 
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empirisch verschillende aspecten van de rol die financiële informatie speelt in 
markten voor activa en kapitaal.  
Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt de informatievoorziening op de markt voor 
activa. Een groot deel van de overdracht van activa tussen bedrijven bestaat 
uit de verkoop van bedrijfsonderdelen, waarbij bedrijven een deel van hun 
activiteiten afstoten en andere behouden. Uit eerdere onderzoek blijkt dat het 
afstoten van bedrijfsonderdelen wordt gebruikt om het domein van de 
activiteiten van de onderneming te wijzigen (Maksimovic en Phillips, 2001), 
waarbij activa worden verkocht aan bedrijven die ze efficiënter kunnen 
inzetten (Hite et al, 1987). Bovendien fungeert de verkoop van 
bedrijfsonderdelen als een primaire financieringsbron (Lang et al., 1995; Bates, 
2005, Arnold et al, 2017), wat de verkopende bedrijven in staat stelt hun 
aandacht te richten op de activiteiten waar ze de meeste waarde kunnen 
toevoegen. Hoewel uit de literatuur blijkt dat het afstoten van 
bedrijfsonderdelen voor zowel verkoper als koper waarde toevoegt (Eckbo en 
Thorburn, 2013), is er nog onvoldoende kennis van het proces van verkoop 
van bedrijfsmiddelen (Borisova et al, 2013). Wat bekend is, is dat er een 
gebrek is aan voldoende openbare informatie over de kwaliteit van 
bedrijfsonderdelen, aangezien de rapportageverplichtingen met betrekking tot 
specifieke delen van bedrijven minder streng zijn dan die voor de 
onderneming als geheel, en bedrijven niet geneigd zijn om dergelijk 
gedetailleerde informatie vrijwillig te verstrekken uit zorg voor hun 
concurrentiepositie (Botosan en Stanford, 2005). Dit betekent dat potentiële 
kopers mogelijk hoge zoekkosten moeten maken, wat op zijn beurt leidt tot 
een minder efficiënte toewijzing van bedrijfsmiddelen. Een openbare 
aankondiging dat bepaalde bedrijfsonderdelen beschikbaar zijn voor verkoop 
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kan worden ingezet om zoekkosten te verminderen en het aantal potentiële 
kopers te vergroten, waardoor de kans op een efficiëntere toewijzing van 
bedrijfsmiddelen toeneemt. 
Het onderzoek naar de informatievoorziening door bedrijven tijdens 
het proces van verkoop van bedrijfsonderdelen leidt tot de volgende 
bevindingen. We laten zien dat in 42% van de voltooide transacties het 
verkopende bedrijf haar voornemen om te verkopen van tevoren aankondigt, 
en stellen vast dat deze vooraankondigingen leiden tot economisch en 
statistisch significante positieve marktreacties. Onze analyses geven verder aan 
dat deze vooraankondigingen worden gebruikt om de ommekeer van slechte 
prestaties en financiële problemen te signaleren. Bovendien duiden onze 
resultaten er enigszins op dat niet vooraf aangekondigde transacties de 
verkoop van zeer gewilde bedrijfsonderdelen betreffen, mogelijk geïnitieerd 
door buitenlandse bieders. Deze schijnbaar verschillende aanleidingen voor de 
twee soorten transacties komen ook overeen met onze belangrijkste bevinding 
dat markten positiever reageren op vooraf aangekondigde transacties dan op 
niet vooraf aangekondigde transacties. Meer specifiek, vooraf aangekondigde 
transacties impliceren dat de toekomst van de resterende activiteiten, hetgeen 
de meerderheid van de activiteiten van de verkopende onderneming vormt, zal 
verbeteren. Het rendement op de niet vooraf aangekondigde transacties lijkt 
echter een premie te weerspiegelen voor het afgestoten bedrijfsonderdeel, dat 
over het algemeen een minderheidsdeel van de verkopende onderneming 
vormt. Een belangrijke implicatie van onze resultaten is dat investeerders 
vooraankondigingen geloofwaardig achten en dat het merendeel van de 
waarderingseffecten van de vooraf aangekondigde afstotingen in de 
aandelenkoers van de verkopende onderneming worden opgenomen 
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voorafgaand aan de aankondiging van de transactie. Dit, in combinatie met 
onze resultaten die suggereren dat de beslissing om de intentie om een 
onderdeel af te stoten van tevoren aan te kondigen gerelateerd is aan de 
motivatie voor de verkoop, heeft implicaties voor empirische analyses van de 
verkoop van bedrijfsonderdelen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt het effect van wijzigingen in 
verslaggevingsstandaarden op de asymmetrische verdeling van informatie 
tussen beleggers, zoals kan worden afgeleid uit veranderingen in de 
transactiekosten. Geconfronteerd met het risico te handelen met partijen die 
beter geïnformeerd zijn, beschermen beleggers zich door een hogere (lagere) 
prijs te vragen (bieden) of zich geheel te onthouden van handel, hetgeen een 
optimale toewijzing van risico en kapitaal belet. De bezorgdheid om minder 
informatie te hebben is met name van belang wanneer de handel in effecten 
van een bedrijf op meer dan één beurs plaatsvindt, waarbij één beurs dichter 
bij het hoofdkantoor van de onderneming ligt. Dit komt doordat de meeste 
waarde relevante informatie in de nabijheid van die beurs wordt gegenereerd, 
vaak wordt gecommuniceerd in de taal van het land van herkomst van het 
bedrijf, en is opgesteld in overeenstemming met de verslaggevingsstandaarden 
van het land van herkomst van het bedrijf (Halling et al., 2007), hetgeen leidt 
tot een informatieachterstand van de beleggers op buitenlandse beurzen. De 
invoering van International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in meer dan 
120 landen, wat een van de grootste wijzigingen in verslaggevingsstandaarden 
tot op heden vormt, stelt ons in staat om het effect van 
verslaggevingsstandaarden op internationale kapitaalstromen te onderzoeken. 
In een steekproef van 239 bedrijven met niveau 2 of 3 ADRs uit 31 
landen, waarvan 27 tussen 2003 en 2012 IFRS hebben ingevoerd, observeren 
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we dat IFRS-implementatie de liquiditeit van ADR's verbetert, hetgeen duidt 
op een vermindering van de informatieachterstand van beleggers die handelen 
op Amerikaanse beurzen. Onze resultaten geven verder aan dat de verbetering 
van de liquiditeit van ADRs afhangt van de kwaliteit van de nationale 
juridische en regulerende instellingen. Analyses die gericht zijn op het 
identificeren van de bron van de verbeteringen tonen niet aan dat de 
superieure kwaliteit van IFRS ten opzichte van de reeds bestaande 
binnenlandse GAAP's de liquiditeitsverbeteringen verklaren, maar wijzen in de 
richting van de schaalvoordelen die voortvloeien uit het verminderen van het 
aantal verslaggevingsstandaarden volgens welke cross-listed bedrijven 
rapporteren. Gezamenlijk duiden onze resultaten erop dat de invoering van 
IFRS op de binnenlandse markt van een aan een Amerikaanse beurs 
genoteerde onderneming de toegang verbetert tot buitenlandse markten die 
het mandaat niet hebben ingevoerd en dat de kapitaalallocatie van 
Amerikaanse beleggers die beperkt zijn tot het beleggen op beurzen in de VS 
mogelijk verbetert. Onze bevindingen bieden verder nieuwe inzichten in de rol 
van verslaggevingsstandaarden bij concurrentie tussen beurzen. 
Ten slotte onderzoek ik in hoofdstuk 4 of de toewijding om 
conservatief te rapporteren de allocatie van kapitaal door managers 
disciplineert. Bestaand empirisch onderzoek richt zich voornamelijk op de rol 
van accounting in de informatievoorziening voor waarderings- en 
controledoeleinden, maar beschouwt veelal de uitkomst van de onderliggende 
economische activiteiten van bedrijven als onafhankelijk van de gebruikte 
verslaggevingsmethode. Meer recent werk endogeniseert de rol van de 
verslaggeving door te erkennen dat de kwaliteit van informatieverstrekking 
door bedrijven de efficiëntie van investeringen kan verbeteren, zowel 
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onderinvestering te verminderen als gevolg van een reductie in de informatie-
asymmetrie tussen bedrijven en externe leveranciers van kapitaal, als door 
overinvestering te verminderen door het vergemakkelijken van contracteren 
en monitoren (Biddle en Hilary, 2006; Biddle et al, 2009). Dit hoofdstuk breidt 
deze onderzoekslijn uit door zich te richten op het effect van conservatieve 
verslaggeving op de efficiëntie van bedrijfsinvesteringen, aangezien er, 
ondanks de centrale rol van conservatisme in verslaggeving, zowel 
tegenstrijdige theoretische voorspellingen als gemengd empirisch bewijs 
bestaat met betrekking tot deze relatie.  
Terwijl ik gebruik maak van de gespreide en onverwachte 
implementatie van overnamebeschermingswetten in verschillende staten van 
de V.S. om endogeniteitsproblemen te verminderen, vind ik bewijs dat duidt 
op een disciplinerend effect van conservatisme op de discretionaire 
bevoegdheid van managers. Meer specifiek stel ik vast dat beleggers minder 
negatief reageren op een toename van de discretionaire bevoegdheid van 
managers voor bedrijven die conservatiever rapporteren. Met behulp van een 
“difference-in-difference” analyse concludeer ik dat bedrijven die 
conservatiever rapporteren hun investeringen in overnames niet verhogen, 
terwijl bedrijven die minder conservatief rapporteren dat wel doen. 
Bovendien, terwijl zowel de operationele winstgevendheid, als het rendement 
en risico op aandelen van minder conservatieve rapporterende bedrijven 
afnemen na een toename van de discretionaire bevoegdheid van managers, 
blijven deze voor conservatiever rapporterende bedrijven onaangetast. Over 
het geheel genomen signaleren de resultaten van dit onderzoek dat een 
toewijding om conservatief te rapporteren inefficiënte investeringen die voort 
kunnen vloeien uit toegenomen bestuurlijke discretie belet. 
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Empirical Studies on the  
Role of Financial Information 
in Asset and Capital Markets
POUYAN GHAZIZADEH
A primary function of capital markets is to efficiently allocate capital, which entails the flow of capital to 
investments with the highest returns commensurate with their risk (Tobin, 1984). The market of corporate 
assets fulfills a similar function, where ideally productive assets are transferred to those most equipped 
to manage them (Manne, 1965). A large body of scientific inquiry identifies informational frictions as 
impediments to the efficient functioning of these markets. To mitigate these adverse effects, firms provide 
financial information to parties external to the firm. For the most part, this information is generated by the 
firms’ accounting function and its presentation and disclosure are guided by accounting standards. The 
studies comprising this dissertation empirically investigate several aspects of the role financial accounting 
information plays in asset and capital markets. 
Chapter 2 investigates the voluntary provision of information in the market of corporate assets sales and 
finds evidence which suggests that these disclosures are used to signal the turnaround of poor prior 
performance and financial distress. Chapter 3 investigates the effect of changes in accounting standards 
(i.e., IFRS) on the asymmetric distribution of information amongst capital market participants. The results 
indicate that IFRS adoption in cross-listed firm’s domestic market improves the liquidity of ADRs, in line 
with the reduction of the information disadvantage of investors trading on U.S. exchanges. Finally, chapter 
4 finds that a commitment to providing conservative accounting information disciplines the allocation of 
capital by managers when state legislation increases managerial discretion.
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